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Lim: Saving Substantial Similarity

SAVING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
Daryl Lim*
Abstract
Substantial similarity, an analysis of the similarity between two
works, is the fulcrum of copyright infringement. Recent cases involving
Led Zeppelin’s signature song “Stairway to Heaven,” the award-winning
movie “The Shape of Water,” and Google and Oracle’s dispute over
computer code all required courts to grapple with this fundamental
analysis. This Article reveals that today’s copyright plaintiffs have only
a one-in-ten chance of winning—the worst in a century—and also
discusses the cause of this trend—defendants’ devastatingly effective
use of pretrial motions and the rise of lawsuits against nonrival
defendants. Scholarly debates on substantial similarity typically revolve
around the works of authorship at issue, circuit splits, and leading cases.
These discussions entirely miss the unprecedented and unreported
demise of substantial similarity.
Rehabilitating the doctrine will require a fresh look at how to judge
substantial similarity. Judging when defendants appropriated too much
can be an inherently opaque and subjective enterprise. To many courts
and scholars, substantial similarity is “bizarre,” “ad hoc,” and “a virtual
black hole in copyright jurisprudence.” Every creative work borrows
some inspiration from other works, whether copyrighted or not. If left
theoretically unaddressed, the law will continue adrift without compass
or rudder, inhibiting the growth of creative industries. Helping plaintiffs
win fairly and viably will be critical in fostering diverse, innovative
ecosystems like architecture, literature, movies, and software flourish.
For this to happen, three things must change.
First, courts must judge works holistically from the vantage of an
ordinary observer and, once plaintiffs prove facial similarity, defendants
should then explain why they are not infringing. Avoiding elemental
dissections of the copyrighted work makes substantial similarity easier
for fact finders to administer, which makes them less likely to penalize
plaintiffs whose works invariably incorporate some unprotectable
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elements. Second, jurors must be the default arbiters of substantial
similarity. Laypeople, and not experts, are copyright’s principal
audience. Third, courts must require copyright registrants to identify the
expressive elements of the works in their registrations, which will help
clarify what they seek to protect and provide better notice to defendants.
Beyond copyright, the observations and insights in this Article map to
broader scholarly debates on rules versus standards, the centrality of jury
trials, and structural biases within the American justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
Substantial similarity, an analysis of the similarity between two
works, is the fulcrum of copyright law.1 Recent cases involving Led
Zeppelin’s signature song “Stairway to Heaven,” the award-winning
movie “The Shape of Water,” and Google and Oracle’s dispute over their
computer code all required courts to grapple with this fundamental
analysis.2 After establishing that defendants copied plaintiffs’ works, the
substantial similarity doctrine requires courts to determine whether
defendants took “enough” from plaintiffs by seeing if the copy was a
misappropriated, colorable variation of the original.3 Its complexity rivals
copyright law’s fair-use defense.4 Judges and scholars have called the
court-developed tests to assess substantial similarity “ad hoc,”5
“bizarre,”6 and “a virtual black hole in copyright jurisprudence.”7 The

1. See Lydia Pallas Loren & R. Anthony Reese, Proving Infringement: Burdens of Proof
in Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 621, 646 (2019) (“The inquiry
into substantial similarity is, in some ways, the heart of many infringement cases.”).
2. See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1056, 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2020) (en
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Skidmore v. Zeppelin, No. 20-142, 2020 WL 5883816 (U.S. Oct. 5,
2020); Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158, 159–60 (9th Cir. 2020); Oracle
Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1185, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct.
520 (2019).
3. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Essay, Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267,
268, 288–89 (2014) (describing substantial similarity as “an essential component of almost all
copyright infringement actions that do not involve outright copying by a defendant”).
4. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement
Analysis, 68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2016) (“The complexity of the modern copyright
infringement analysis cannot be overstated. Often referred to as the ‘substantial similarity’
requirement, its structure, scope, and purpose continue to confound courts and scholars—perhaps
even more so (and more routinely) than the infamous fair use doctrine.”); see also 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], Lexis+ (database updated Aug.
2020) (recognizing the substantial similarity doctrine as “one of the most difficult questions in
copyright law”); Pamela Samuelson, Essay, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright
Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2013) (describing substantial similarity as “[a]
central puzzle for U.S. copyright law in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries”).
5. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(opinion of Judge Learned Hand).
6. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (referring to the substantial similarity doctrine in the
title).
7. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 794; see also Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1823 (arguing
each of these tests is flawed and that courts have generally failed to provide clear guidance about
which test to apply in which kinds of cases); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The
Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 716–38 (2012) (critiquing the tests).
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debate has gone on for decades, with no end in sight.8 To make matters
worse, courts must apply these tests across a diverse set of industries and
creative products.9
As a result, lawyers cannot adequately evaluate claims of copyright
infringement that they receive.10 Unlike patent law, where courts can rely
on claims to delineate the boundaries of their plaintiff’s property rights
(even if claim construction methodologies are underdetermined and the
results of applying them may vary), substantial similarity’s indefiniteness
gives rise to no more than “the right to hire a lawyer.”11 Despite circuit
court divisions over tests for substantial similarity, the U.S. Supreme
Court has remained silent.12
The problem is that judging substantial similarity demands courts to
apply subjective, value-based judgments to the facts without clear
guidance on how to do so. The result is a patchwork of rhetoric resting
on confusing generalizations that ultimately translate into “I’ll know it

8. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62
DUKE L.J. 203, 214 (2012) (viewing substantial similarity as a mechanism of conceptually
sequencing values in copyright law and informing a more coherent framework for the fair-use
doctrine); Kevin J. Hickey, Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 681,
718–19 (2016) (arguing courts should adopt a flexible, contextual approach to framing); Daniel
Gervais, Improper Appropriation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 600 (2019) (suggesting that
propriety should play an enhanced role in cases of reuse of preexisting copyrighted works); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1005 (1990) (“The determination of substantial
similarity is largely subjective, thus permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive
judgment of the perceived equities in a case.”); Katherine Lippman, Comment, The Beginning of
the End: Preliminary Results of an Empirical Study of Copyright Substantial Similarity Opinions
in the U.S. Circuit Courts, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 541 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the
substantial similarity doctrine has perplexed students, scholars, and courts for decades.”).
9. See Michael L. Sharb, Getting A “Total Concept and Feel” of Copyright Infringement,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 903, 904 (1993) (arguing that “the ad hoc nature of copyright infringement”
requires a flexible test, and “[y]et, there must be a common structure in order for the courts, as in
other areas of the law, to build an underlying body of substantive common law”); see also
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1821 (arguing for courts “to tailor infringement analysis based on the
nature of the works at issue”); Nicole Lieberman, Note, Un-Blurring Substantial Similarity:
Aesthetic Judgments and Romantic Authorship in Music Copyright Law, 6 NYU J. INTELL. PROP.
& ENT. L. 91, 93 (2016) (“[C]ourts have crafted an impressionistic doctrine that has drifted far
from copyright’s original economic purpose of incentivizing creation.”).
10. Robert F. Helfing, Substantial Similarity and Junk Science: Reconstructing the Test of
Copyright Infringement, 30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 735, 737 (2020) (“The
elusive standard frustrates the effective evaluation of claims by lawyers, generating unnecessary
litigation.”); see also Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Note, Do We Even Need A Test? A Reevaluation of
Assessing Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1375
(2007) (“The improper appropriation analysis, for both courts and litigants, is one of the most
contentious and least precisely defined inquires in copyright law.” (footnote omitted)).
11. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) (referring to fair use).
12. See infra notes 165–166 and accompanying text.
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when I see it” determinations.13 This indeterminacy is troubling. Blindly
navigating the morass of caselaw on substantial similarity without
understanding its contours risks defeating the purpose of copyright law
itself.14
It is worth noting at this early stage that there are two problems:
variability (because of the different tests applied in different circuits) and
uncertainty (given that none of the tests have determinate content). The
variability leads to different results concerning the uncertainty of when
courts apply a given test to a large sample of cases. Failing to understand
how substantial similarity works prevents courts and scholars from
clearly outlining the necessary components of plaintiffs’ evidence in
infringement cases and obscures the standards courts should identify in
the cases before them.15 This state of affairs may result in false positives
and chill efforts by rivals, as well as those in ancillary markets, from
developing noninfringing works, and it may even cause them to abandon
their efforts if they cannot afford to face those unnecessarily heightened
risks.16 Unaddressed, copyright law will continue adrift without compass
or rudder, inhibiting the growth of creative industries.
The American economy rests at a transcendent and transformative
inflection point in its history, and the vitality of the substantial similarity
doctrine forms an essential part of it. The stakes for getting the law on
substantial similarity right are high. In 2017, copyright industries in the
United States contributed over $1 trillion to the gross domestic product,
accounted for almost 7% of the U.S. economy, and employed about 6
million workers, comprising close to 4% of the entire workforce in the
13. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[A] (“The determination of the extent of
similarity [which] will constitute a substantial, and hence infringing, similarity presents one of
the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible of helpful
generalizations.” (footnote omitted)); Hickey, supra note 8, at 682 (“[S]ubstantial similarity,
copyright law’s core infringement inquiry, is a mess. Once the law allows that non-exact copies
are actionable, courts need some method to determine when two works are so alike that one should
be deemed an actionable infringement of the other.”); Jarrod M. Mohler, Comment, Toward a
Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 971, 972 (2000) (describing the “indeterminacy and misapplication of tests for copyright
infringement”).
14. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 737 (“It also produces legal decisions that defeat the
purposes of copyright law more often than should be tolerated.”).
15. See Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling
Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1990) (arguing that a
correct perception of the nature of similarity is necessary to “clarify the elements of proof required
in copyright infringement cases, the variety of methods available to establish those elements and
the proper standards for appellate review of infringement issues”).
16. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1387
(2015) (describing the “added layer of perniciousness” of overclaiming stemming from uncertain
copyright scope for downstream creators and concluding that clarity “may not only decrease
constraint’s costs but also increase its benefits”).
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United States.17 In 2018, litigants filed nearly 6,000 copyright
infringement cases, a threefold increase from the number of cases filed a
decade ago.18 On average, copyright cases cost between $200,000 and
$1 million to litigate.19
The most important and immediate benefit of reforming substantial
similarity is that plaintiffs will once again have a viable means of
enforcing their copyrights when they should be able to prove improper,
actionable infringement. Today, copyright plaintiffs have only a one-inten chance of winning—the worst in a century.20 Giving copyright
plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to win meritorious lawsuits benefits
the flourishing of diverse, creative ecosystems like architecture,
literature, movies, and software.21
Scholarly debates on substantial similarity typically revolve around
the works of authorship at issue, circuit splits, and leading cases; they
have entirely missed the unprecedented and unreported demise in
copyright plaintiffs’ ability to prove substantial similarity.22 This Article
reveals that defendants’ devastatingly effective use of pretrial motions
and the courts’ focus on market effect as a heuristic are the two key
culprits to substantial similarity’s demise, and it argues that rehabilitating
the doctrine to permit plaintiffs to win when they should do so will
require a fresh look at how to judge substantial similarity.23 For this to
happen, three things must change.
First, courts must judge works holistically from the vantage of an
ordinary observer and, once plaintiffs prove facial similarity, defendants
should then explain why their works are not infringing.24 Nevertheless,
courts must still determine what the protected expressive elements of the
allegedly infringed works are and how those compare as a whole to the
allegedly infringing works.25 Avoiding elemental dissection of the
copyrighted work initially will make substantial similarity easier for fact
finders to administer, which makes them less likely to penalize plaintiffs
17. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 3 (2018),
https://iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/12/2018CpyrtRptFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVR3-ZDCT].
18. See Just the Facts: Intellectual Property Cases—Patent, Copyright, and Trademark,
U.S. COURTS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/02/13/just-facts-intellectualproperty-cases-patent-copyright-and-trademark#figures_map [https://perma.cc/X9YU-L28V]
(condensing relevant statistics to a line graph in Figure 1).
19. See ASS’N RSCH., INC., AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
2017, at 41, 44 (2017); TOD I. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., ASSETS & FINANCE: INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CYBER CLAIMS § 1:6 (2011) (noting that the average cost of
litigating a copyright case was $440,000, according to a 2005 report).
20. See infra Section II.A.2.
21. See infra Section II.A.3.
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. See infra Sections II.B–C.
24. See infra Section III.B.
25. See infra Section III.B.1.
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whose works invariably incorporate some unprotectable elements. Of
course, one still needs to assess unprotectable elements and determine,
“as a whole,” what the creative advance is that defines the “creative
work” that is then compared to the allegedly infringing work for
substantial similarity. However, that task should fall on defendants, who,
as courts have noted, are the parties best positioned to do so.26
Second, jurors should be restored as the default arbiters of substantial
similarity.27 Laypeople, and not experts, are copyright’s principal
audience.28 The need to clarify the jury’s role in copyright litigation has
become more relevant than ever due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
ordering of Google and Oracle to file supplemental briefs concerning the
appropriate standard of review for the jury’s fair use verdict in favor of
Google in their copyright litigation.29
Design law successfully undertook similar corrective measures over
a decade ago.30 Those corrective measures hold valuable lessons to
reforming substantial similarity and improving both its administrability
and predictability.31
Third, courts must require copyright registrants to identify the
expressive elements of the works in their registrations, which will help
clarify what they seek to protect and provide notice to defendants. Unlike
with patents, copyright registrants need not know the prior art to state
that they think something is copyrightable expression. Nor does the fact
that copyrights are registered but not examined matter since courts expert
judgments about whether the claimed expressive elements (by
themselves or in combination) or protectable expression are either
copyrightable are not always needed.
Courts can then properly focus on both technical and economic
aspects of substantial similarity. Currently, it appears courts use rivalry
as a heuristic for operationalizing substantial similarity because technical
analysis is too complicated.32 What is substantially similar needs a
greater definition of how much time, money, and effort is needed for
protection and avoidance, mainly where the alleged infringer builds off
of or partially incorporates the idea, as in the case of satires and parodies.
Simplifying substantial similarity will help courts properly consider both
technical and economic aspects of the inquiry.
See infra notes 350–51, 371–74 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.B.2.
See infra Section III.C.2.
Jan Wolfe, SCOTUS Asks for More Briefing in Oracle v. Google Copyright Case,
REUTERS (May 4, 2020, 9:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ip-copyright-oracle/scotusasks-for-more-briefing-in-oracle-v-google-copyright-case-idUSL1N2CN01G [https://perma.cc/
58SJ-JWGS].
30. See infra Section III.B.1–2.
31. See infra Section III.B.
32. See infra Section II.C.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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Part I describes the confusing patchwork of substantial similarity law,
as well as the challenging task fact finders undertake in every case. It also
sketches the empirical aspects of this Article and their limits.33 Part II
then reports on substantial similarity’s silent death.34 It looks beyond the
clamor of scholarly debate over the confusing tests and circuit variations
to reveal a surprising partnership between judges and defendants. Part II
also highlights the impact suing nonrivals has on case outcomes. Finally,
Part III presents the playbook for revitalizing substantial similarity.
Beyond copyright, the discussion here contributes directly to broader
scholarly debates on rules versus standards, the centrality of jury trials,
and structural biases within the American justice system.35
I. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT’S BLACK BOX
Congress has the constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries” to benefit the public.36 Through the Copyright Act of
1976,37 authors of “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression” may obtain protection for a limited duration.38
These “works of authorship” encompass literary, architectural,
pictorial, sculptural, and graphic works.39 They must contain “at least
some minimal degree of creativity,” but “even a slight amount will
suffice.”40 Most make the grade “as they possess some creative spark, ‘no
matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”41 In doing so,
copyright protects works that might be similar to those in the public
domain or to other copyrightable works.42 Moreover, this makes
infringement rather than validity the principal means of regulating the
scope of those rights.43
33. Adapted from findings in an extensive empirical study on substantial similarity in Daryl
Lim, Substantial Similarity’s Silent Death, PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
34. Id.
35. See infra Section III.C.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also Roodhuyzen, supra note 10, at 1379 (“[T]he Act specifies
in detail the kinds of works that are protected and for how long; creates protection even without
registration or notice; assigns exclusive rights and allows for transfer and division of ownership
and rights; and creates various remedies including damages and fines.” (quoting Jason Mazzone,
Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1037–38 (2006))).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
40. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
41. Id. (quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][1] (1990)).
42. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2226
(2016).
43. See id.
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Authors enjoy a bundle of rights to reproduce, distribute, and display
their works, prepare derivative works, and publicly perform.44 To enforce
these rights, the Copyright Act empowers copyright owners to sue for
infringement.45 Unfortunately, neither the Act nor its legislative history
explains what plaintiffs must show to claim infringement. Courts,
therefore, devised the rule that plaintiffs must prove both that they have
a valid copyright in the work and that the defendant wrongfully copied
from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.46 Substantial similarity’s
foundation as an ad hoc doctrine originates here.47 Judging substantial
similarity can be daunting because the fact finder must distinguish
copyrightable expression from unprotected factual descriptions without
linguistic aids like those found in patent claims.48 The doctrinal
patchwork of rules juxtaposed on a factually intensive inquiry produces
a morass of unclear precedent almost by default.
This Part establishes the substantial similarity doctrine’s place within
an otherwise intricately crafted statutory framework that is the Copyright
Act.49 After Section I.A lays out the elements of infringement, Section
I.B reviews the various tests circuit courts have devised to answer the
substantial similarity inquiry. It concludes with the limit courts placed on
substantial similarity to protect defendants and the public’s right to enjoy
uncopyrightable material.50
A. Actual Copying
In copyright infringement cases, the plaintiff must show the defendant
copied material from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work rather than creating
it or copying it from another source, and that the defendant copied enough
copyrighted material from the plaintiff’s work.51 The plaintiff’s first task
is to prove actual copying and to do so using either direct or indirect
evidence.52 While showing that the defendant directly copied the work
verbatim seems like the most obvious method of doing this, direct proof
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
45. See id. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .”); id.
§ 501(b) (“The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to
institute an action for any infringement . . . .”).
46. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
47. See id. at 345, 361.
48. See infra Section III.B.3.
49. See infra Section I.A.
50. See infra Section I.B.
51. Eric Osterberg, Copyright Litigation: Analyzing Substantial Similarity, PRACTICAL
LAW, https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-524-1501.
52. See id. (noting that direct proof of actual copying includes admissions, eyewitness
testimony, and “[t]he presence of watermarks or other features in the defendant’s work
conclusively identifying the plaintiff’s work as the source”).
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of actual copying is scarce.53 Eyewitnesses are hard to come by, and it is
even harder to find infringers who voluntarily confess.54 Most allegedly
infringing works are not identical, which explains why substantial
similarity plays such an outsized role in copyright infringement.55
Without evidence of direct copying, “striking similarity” is the first
way for owners to show actual copying through indirect evidence.56
Striking similarity is a likeness between works so exact it cannot be
explained other than by copying, thereby creating an inference of actual
copying or access to the plaintiff’s work.57 The second way plaintiffs can
prove actual copying by indirect evidence is through circumstantial
evidence of access paired with “probative similarity.”58 This requires
plaintiffs to show the defendant had a reasonable possibility of accessing
their work and that similarities between the works are probative of actual
copying.59 Courts sometimes confuse probative similarity (which looks
to the defendant’s actions for evidence of copying) with substantial
similarity (which looks to the works themselves to see if the amount
copied was permissible).60
A plaintiff might also prove the defendant had access through
widespread dissemination of the plaintiff’s work,61 or that the plaintiff
53. See Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1275–76 (1984)
(“Because pirates are unlikely to be obvious about their copying, proof of the direct use of the
copyrighted work in preparing a copy is virtually impossible.” (footnote omitted)).
54. See ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 161 (5th ed. 1979) (discussing the importance
of circumstantial evidence in copyright litigation).
55. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.01[B] (“It is generally not possible to
establish copying as a factual matter by direct evidence, as it is rare that the plaintiff has available
a witness to the physical act of copying. . . . Therefore, copying is ordinarily established indirectly
by the plaintiff's proof of access and ‘substantial’ similarity.” (footnotes omitted)).
56. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (introducing the idea of “striking
similarity” by holding that “the similarities [between the two works] must be so striking as to
preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant” created the work independently), abrogated
on other grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975). Courts
consider the similarities’ quirks, including mistakes or idiosyncrasies attributed to copying. See,
e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170–71 (7th Cir. 1997); Lipton v. Nature
Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471–72 (2d Cir. 1995).
57. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Arnstein, 154 F.2d
at 468); Malibu Textiles, Inc. v. Label Lane Int’l, Inc., 922 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir.), cert denied
sub nom. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP v. Malibu Textiles, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 456 (2019).
58. Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1175
(2019), reh’g denied, 139 S. Ct. 1596 (2019).
59. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
speculative possibility of access was insufficient to establish probative similarity), overruled in
part by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
60. See Tanksley, 902 F.3d at 173.
61. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d. Cir. 1983)
(finding that the defendant may have had access to a song because of its widespread popularity
on music charts).
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sent the work to the defendant to review.62 As with striking similarity, the
plaintiff can show similar uses of public domain material, similar details,
or errors in the plaintiff’s work that would be unexpected without
copying.63 Some courts endorse a sliding scale approach, called the
“inverse ratio rule,” where more substantial evidence of access requires
less evidence of probative similarity. In Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin,64 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court recently joined other
circuits in clarifying the inverse ratio rule did not apply to substantial
similarity.65 Specifically, the court noted that the majority of other
circuits that considered the rule (the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits) declined to adopt it.66 Skidmore criticized the law as illogical
because complete access should not preclude the need for plaintiffs to
show similarity as it provides an unfair advantage to those with more
accessible works.67
Post-Skidmore, however, it remains uncertain whether and to what
extent the inverse ratio rule lives on in the actual copying limb of the
copyright infringement inquiry. The Ninth Circuit noted that “[b]y
rejecting the inverse ratio rule, we are not suggesting that access cannot
serve as circumstantial evidence of actual copying in all cases.”68 Thus,
access and probative similarity can still prove that actual copying
occurred. Skidmore appears to leave intact the line of cases holding that
striking similarity can constitute actual copying even with limited
evidence of access.
In any case, not all copying amounts to infringement. The accused
work and copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work must also be
sufficiently substantial to amount to an unlawful appropriation. Plaintiffs
must prove substantial similarity—a challenge courts have described as
“vague” and “arbitrary.”69
62. See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 2001).
63. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); L.A.
Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part by
Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 959 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2020).
64. 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Skidmore v. Zeppelin,
No. 20-142, 2020 WL 5883816 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020).
65. See id. at 1069; see also Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (criticizing
and declining to apply the inverse ratio rule).
66. Skidmore, 952 F.3d at 1066.
67. Id. at 1068 (“[T]he inverse ratio rule unfairly advantages those whose work is most
accessible by lowering the standard of proof for [probative] similarity.”); see also id. (noting that
access can be established readily in cases when the plaintiff’s work is available on YouTube,
Netflix, Spotify, and other platforms).
68. Id. at 1069.
69. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“The
test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague.”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (explaining that drawing the line between what is protected and
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B. Substantial Similarity
The substantial similarity inquiry seeks to determine whether two
works share such a similar copyrightable expression that one infringes
upon the other, making the copying wrongful.70 The inquiry rests on the
nature of the alleged infringement, the court’s substantial similarity test,
and the limits to substantial similarity—whether the defendant copied
unprotectable content, as well as the amount and importance of the
material that the defendant copied from the plaintiff’s work. 71 The
problem, however, is that the protectable elements of any work can be
dissected to a point where almost nothing remains but its unprotectable
parts, and caselaw provides little indication of where to stop in the
reductionist analysis.72 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
once noted that, if dissection is taken too far, “there can be no originality
in a painting because all colors of paint have been used somewhere in the
past.”73 It follows that just as originality can be found in every allegedly
unoriginal work, unoriginality can be found in almost every unoriginal
work. How much originality will convince a court is inherently uncertain,
so what constitutes infringement becomes a crapshoot as well.74 The
difficulty of this task may help explain why judges, believing in their
expertise and efficiency, ultimately decided to wrest the substantial
similarity inquiry from jurors, as Section II.B discusses.
Courts employ three main tests or some combination thereof: the
ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and the

what is not “will seem arbitrary, [but] that is no excuse for not drawing it”); see also Murray Hill
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing
part of the substantial similarity inquiry as “complex”).
70. See Gervais, supra note 8, at 600 (“The second prong is satisfied when (i) protected
expression in the earlier work was copied and (ii) the ‘amount of the copyrighted work that is
copied . . . must be more than “de minimis.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting Castle Rock Ent.,
Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp. Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998))).
71. See, e.g., Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120–21 (discussing allegations of copying plot elements
and characters from a play into a motion picture). This could also include copying computer code
from the plaintiff's copyrighted software or a sample of musical recording.
72. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 740 (“By considering only elements deemed protectable
at an arbitrary level of dissection, courts fail to reliably identify the similar content that they
evaluate for protectability.”). It should be noted that it is the combination (or particular
organization of expressive elements) that may be original and novel, so dissection does not
actually reduce to nothing. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th
Cir. 1994).
73. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995).
74. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[A] (“[T]he test for infringement of a
copyright is of necessity vague.” (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489)); see also Gates
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993) (“This is primarily a
qualitative rather than a purely quantitative analysis and must be performed on a case-by-case
basis.” (citation omitted)).
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abstraction/filtration/comparison test.75 Most either adopt the Second
Circuit’s ordinary observer test or the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic
test.76 A few adopt the “abstraction/filtration/comparison” test or
variations of these tests.77 All three tests attempt to compare protectable
elements in the copyrighted work.78
1. The Ordinary Observer Test
The Second Circuit’s ordinary observer test has the longest vintage of
the three tests and finds its roots in Arnstein v. Porter.79 In his seminal
article, Professor Alan Latman observed that the ordinary observer test,
“when properly understood, remains the most instructive guide to
proving infringement.”80 Sadly, modern courts would depart from
Arnstein with devastating consequences for plaintiffs and the vitality of
the substantial similarity doctrine.
In Arnstein, composer Ira Arnstein sued Cole Porter for infringing
copies of his songs, including unpublished ones.81 These songs ranged
from a million copies sold to a copy kept in Arnstein’s room that had been
ransacked on several occasions in “burglaries” that the defendant “could
have” had something to do with.82 There was no direct evidence Porter
had ever seen or heard Arnstein’s compositions.83 Porter moved for
summary judgment, claiming to have never heard Arnstein’s songs.84
a. How to Judge Substantial Similarity?
Arnstein made three key contributions. Its initial and most important
contribution was how the standard for “improper appropriation,” which
courts eventually renamed “substantial similarity,” should be judged.85 In
this regard, the court held:
Assuming that adequate proof is made of copying, that is not
enough; for there can be “permissible copying,” copying
which is not illicit. Whether (if he copied) defendant
75. Hickey, supra note 8, at 690, 692, 694, 699 (“A better (though still imperfect)
comparison looks to the results under the three main tests: the observer, extrinsic/intrinsic, and
A/F/C tests.”).
76. See infra Section II.A.1 and Figure 1.
77. See infra Section II.A.1 and Figure 1.
78. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 739.
79. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus.
Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975); see Latman, supra note 15, at 1191 (“One may, in tracing
the history of the proof of infringement, justifiably start with the legendary Arnstein v. Porter.”).
80. Latman, supra note 15, at 1191.
81. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Latman, supra note 15, at 1192 (quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468).
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unlawfully appropriated presents, too, an issue of fact. The
proper criterion on that issue is not an analytic or other
comparison of the respective musical compositions as they
appear on paper or in the judgment of trained musicians.
The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential
financial returns from his compositions which derive from
the lay public’s approbation of his efforts. The question,
therefore, is whether [the] defendant took from plaintiff’s
works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners,
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is
composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.86
There are several important takeaways here. First, when a court looks
at substantial similarity, it is already satisfied that the defendant copied
the plaintiff’s work. Second, the plaintiff must nonetheless convince the
adjudicator that the defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s work by
showing it took “so much of what is pleasing to” the audience of the
plaintiff’s work. The ordinary observer test attempts to compare the two
works from the perspective of a hypothetical lay observer and focuses on
similarities between the works rather than their differences. Similarities
suggest defendants saw and copied the works instead of independently
creating them.87
The author’s original contribution informs the qualitative and
quantitative taking needed. Some copyrighted work represents significant
creative effort and enjoys robust protection, whereas others reflect only
scant creativity.88 Dissimilarities may be substantial if a defendant’s work
takes on a different overall concept and feel than the plaintiff’s work or
has unprotectable elements allegedly taken from the plaintiff.89 The more
differences that exist between the two works, the less likely that the
defendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s work.90 However, trivial
dissimilarities may be insignificant, due to elements similar to those in

86. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472–73 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dymow v.
Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926)).
87. See Latman, supra note 15, at 1189.
88. See Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir.
1994) (“[T]he scope of copyright protection [is] a sliding scale that changes with the availability
of expressions for a given idea . . . .”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03[A][4] (“More
similarity is required when less protectible matter is at issue.”).
89. See Attia v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1999).
90. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the plaintiff’s work that the defendant did not copy from the plaintiff or
merely added to the material copied from the plaintiff.91
Third, substantial similarity is a standard, not a structured rule that
requires dissection of copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements
subject to expert evidence. As one treatise observed, “The ordinary
observer test is no more than an attempt to gauge the reaction of the
ordinary ‘man on the street’ to the two works . . . . The fact finder decides
whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”92
Arnstein made clear that expert testimony and dissections of the works
are “irrelevant” to this determination and that the final judgment should
be made based on a lay listener’s impression about the impropriety of the
appropriation.93 The court saw the jury as being more representative of
the audience for the copyrighted work, indicating that it would “be proper
to exclude tone-deaf persons from the jury,” as they would no longer be
typical consumers.94 A judge would not likely consume popular music
and, therefore, ought to employ an advisory jury.95
The ordinary observer does not need to decompose the works into
their constituent elements or filter out unprotectable parts, and for a good
reason. Real-world audiences of copyrighted works consume them based
on a holistic reception of the work, and they do not conduct an elementby-element analysis of their copyrightable features. Courts could allow
expert testimony to help the jury determine the reaction of lay listeners.96
Arnstein gave courts a malleable and yet predictable standard for
assessing substantial similarity.
Courts in other circuits regarded Arnstein as defective. The First,
Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all apply some form of a “more
discerning” ordinary observer test.97 The reformulated test, dubbed the
“more discerning ordinary observer test,” requires plaintiffs to prove
copying of expressive elements; fact finders then must filter
unprotectable elements out and determine—only based on the remaining
91. See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir.
1988). This may depend on the amount of material not copied from the plaintiff or perhaps the
elements in the defendant’s work that the defendant did not copy from the plaintiff. See, e.g., id.;
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[N]o plagiarist can
excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”).
92. ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT
LAW § 3:1.1[A] (2020) (footnote omitted).
93. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds by
Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).
94. Id. at 473 & n.22.
95. See id. at 473.
96. See id.
97. Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1391–97 (2007).
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protectable elements—whether the overall look and feel of the works are
substantially similar.98 As Part II shows, the modified test has become the
nation’s de facto test for substantial similarity.99
The fuzzy limits between protectable and unprotectable elements have
made substantial similarity a treacherous terrain to navigate. Substantial
similarity excludes ideas,100 scènes à faire,101 and ideas that have limited
means of expression, otherwise known as the merger doctrine. 102 Other
limitations, such as the uncopyrightability of colors, letters, and
geometric forms, overlap with or are contained within these three main
categories.103 Interwoven within the idea/expression dichotomy, scènes à
faire, and the merger doctrine, modern courts must also consider both the
quantitative significance of the copied material and the importance of the
content copied in the plaintiff’s work.104 According to Judge Learned
Hand, “no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must
therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”105
As far back as 1987, Professor Amy Cohen warned that the concept
of substantial similarity itself has become more, rather than less,
ambiguous as it has been subjected to judicial interpretation over the
years.106 Tests like the more discerning ordinary observer test require
courts to dissect a work for comparison without providing an adequately
theorized means of doing so. This necessarily makes every case the
decision maker’s value judgment, rendering cases unmoored in
98. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 265, 268–69, 272–73 (2d Cir. 2001) (considering
elements of a copyrighted quilt taken from the public domain).
99. The Fourth Circuit compares the works through the eyes of their “intended audience.”
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990). Since copyrighted works are
usually intended for the public at large, the intended audience and the ordinary observer are
therefore typically the same. See id. at 734.
100. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[I]deas, concepts, and the like
found in the common domain are the inheritance of everyone.”).
101. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[E]lements of
a work that are ‘indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic’—like
cowboys, bank robbers, and shootouts in stories of the American West—get no protection.”
(quoting Hoehling v. Univeral City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980))).
102. Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“[W]hen an idea can be expressed in very few ways, copyright law does not protect that
expression, because doing so would confer a de facto monopoly over the idea. In such cases idea
and expression are said to be merged.”).
103. See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 132
(2d Cir. 2003).
104. See Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d
1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008).
105. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
106. Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of
Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 722–23 (1987).
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standardless precedents and difficult for attorneys to evaluate.107 It is also
difficult for juries to determine infringement.108
Far from being a defect, the genius of Arnstein lay in its requirement
for holistic comparisons. Arnstein simply required a comprehensive sideby-side comparison of the works to see if enough was misappropriated, a
task simple enough that the court was satisfied jurors could do.109
Arnstein’s jury-centered inquiry also grounds the technical inquiry in a
lay audience’s perception rather than the technical sensibilities of an
expert blended with the rarified tastes of judges imbibing the works from
their chambers. Defendants could then argue that what they copied was
unprotectable—a finding courts are well accustomed to making.110
b. Who Should Judge Substantial Similarity?
Arnstein’s second crucial contribution was about who should judge
substantial similarity. The court stated “[s]urely, then, we have an issue
of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.”111 The court noted:
The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts
or their views as to the musical excellence of plaintiff’s or
defendant’s works are utterly immaterial on the issue of
misappropriation; for the views of such persons are caviar to
the general [public]—and plaintiff’s and defendant’s
compositions are not caviar.112
Since judges are unlikely to listen to popular music, they should rely on
a jury.113 Similarly, it would “be proper to exclude tone-deaf persons
from the jury,” as they would not be typical consumers of musical
works.114 The opinion also noted the appropriateness of denying
summary judgment when “there is the slightest doubt as to the facts,” and
it stressed the importance of in-court cross-examination.115
Judge Clark wrote a sharp dissent arguing that the majority was
creating “chaos, judicial as well as musical,” and defending the propriety
107. See Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1338 (2012)
(“[S]ubstantial similarity can become confusing for even experienced attorneys and judges . . . .”).
108. Id. (“The empirical research casts concerns as to how judges and juries may adjudicate
such situations of artistic uncertainty.”).
109. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other
grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).
110. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (noting that the idea of bookkeeping
would not be copyrightable).
111. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 473 n.22.
115. Id. at 468–70 (quoting Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135
(2d Cir. 1945)).
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of judges deciding the issue on summary judgment.116 He was skeptical
about the jury’s ability to identify improper appropriation:
I should not have thought it pre-eminently fitted to decide
questions of musical values, certainly not so much so that an
advisory jury should be brought in if no other is available.
And I should myself hesitate to utter so clear an invitation to
exploitation of slight musical analogies by clever musical
tricks in the hope of getting juries hereafter in this circuit to
divide the wealth of Tin Pan Alley.117
Judge Clark would also have allowed dissection and expert testimony,
since “[m]usic is a matter of the intellect as well as the emotions; that is
why eminent musical scholars insist upon the employment of the
intellectual faculties for a just appreciation of music.”118 As Section II.B
shows, Judge Clark’s dissenting view took root and likewise had
disastrous consequences for plaintiffs in the decades to come.119
Pretrial motions are a particularly inappropriate means to dispose of a
substantial similarity argument. The underlying facts and the weight of
inferences are likely to be in dispute. The mixed question should be
treated as more like a question of fact (and thus for the jury) than one of
law (and thus for the judge, including at summary or final judgment once
the jury has provided its fact-finding). One judge’s opinion on inference
in the substantial similarity analysis may not reflect the consensus
opinion of a jury.120 Pretrial motions may foreclose plaintiffs from
realizing an otherwise meritorious cause of action. A judge who disposes
of a substantial similarity argument on a pretrial motion runs a real risk
of ignoring the wide disparity of opinion that arises in the fact-finding
process in understanding of lay juror perceptions of similarity.
c. How Broadly Should a Plaintiff’s Economic Interests Extend?
Arnstein’s third crucial contribution is what substantial similarity
would cover. Arnstein was a composer but sought relief against Porter’s
phonorecords and public performances of his plagiarized works.121 They
were not direct rivals. In other words, the Arnstein test looked at both the
economic and technical aspects of the similarities.122 In contrast to the
technical aspects discussed above, the economic aspects focus more on
whether the parties are rivals. Where the defendant used the entire work
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 480 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 476.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.C.2.
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
See id. at 469, 473.
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or made an identical copy, there is no need to compare the parties’ works
in a substantial similarity analysis.123 Where the works have similar
expressive elements, this general similarity in “total concept and feel”
could include defendants who copied plot elements and characters from
a play into a motion picture.124
The amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying are the third
factor in the fair-use analysis, and courts sometimes avoid a substantial
similarity analysis by finding that what the defendant copied was fair
use.125 In this regard, fair use is simply another way of defining what
conduct is not infringing. Copyright law gives authors temporary market
exclusivity to recoup their investments and profit from their creativity.126
This encourages further creativity both from those authors and from
others enticed by the promise of a reward.127 The copyright system
therefore enables copyright owners to reallocate those rights in two ways:
through licenses and by allowing others to use the work through
consuming the work or by building on it.128 The Copyright Act thus
includes the right “to prepare derivative works based [on] the copyrighted
work.”129 Indeed, since derivative work rights and substantial similarity
both focus on nonliteral infringement, they are two ways of asking the
same critical question about the point at which copying becomes
inappropriate. As this Article shows in Section II.C, later courts, perhaps
confounded with the difficulty of applying the convoluted technical tests
123. E.g., Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.
2012).
124. E.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th
Cir. 1970)), overruled by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc); see
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
125. See, e.g., SOFA Ent., Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273, 1278–80 (9th Cir.
2013). Courts also may find that the use was minimal, and therefore noninfringing. See, e.g., VMG
Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 880, 887 (9th Cir. 2016).
126. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
127. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J.
ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 35–36 (2003).
128. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Rules and Standards in Copyright, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 583, 590
(2014) (identifying the consumptive and productive uses of a copyrighted work); see also
Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L.
317, 335 (2009) (defining “‘consumptive’ infringement” as “infringement involving the
reproduction and distribution of copies that are either exact or near enough so that they are almost
certain to compete with the original work for patronage” (emphasis omitted)).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); id. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).
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of their own making, focused instead on the more accessible economic
aspects, leading to plaintiffs’ win rates plummeting.130
While the Second Circuit significantly altered Arnstein’s ordinary
observer test, it mostly heeded Arnstein’s warning against employing
expert evidence in the court’s substantial similarity test.131 The Ninth
Circuit had no such qualms; in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,132 it further pushed substantial
similarity from being a standard to being a structured rule.133
2. The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test
Ostensibly, the judges in Sid & Marty were concerned that “copying”
and “substantial similarity” might result in liability when defendants only
took nonprotected ideas.134 It decided to introduce a two-step procedure
that would first determine whether defendants took only ideas—a test it
called “extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the trier of
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed” by experts
if necessary.135 Second, it would determine whether substantial similarity
existed between the expressions—a test labeled “intrinsic” because it
“depend[s] on the response of the ordinary reasonable person” rather than
“the type of external criteria and analysis which marks the extrinsic
test.”136 Plaintiffs would win if they satisfied both the extrinsic and
intrinsic tests, so if either favored the defendant there would be no
infringement.137 The Ninth Circuit uses this “total concept and feel”138
test “to restrict the scope of a plaintiff’s copyright from extending to
(unprotectable) ideas.”139 In a nod to Arnstein, it targets the subjective
quality of the work as its “intended audience” perceives.140
According to Sid & Marty, “This same type of bifurcated test was
announced” in Arnstein, and the “unlawful appropriation” in Arnstein’s
second prong meant only taking protected expression rather than
130. See infra Section II.C.
131. See Gervais, supra note 8, at 608–10 (contrasting the Second Circuit where expert
testimony is occasionally used with the Ninth Circuit where expert testimony is “frequently
utilized”).
132. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051
(9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
133. Id. at 1164.
134. See id. at 1162–63.
135. Id. at 1164.
136. Id.
137. See Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 1994).
138. Jeannette Rene Busek, Comment, Copyright Infringement: A Proposal for a New
Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Variation, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1777, 1790 (1998).
139. Douglas Y’Barbo, The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright
Infringement, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 285, 302 (1999).
140. Busek, supra note 138, at 1790–91.
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unprotected ideas.141 At the same time, the opinion declared: “We do not
resurrect the Arnstein approach today. Rather, we formulate an extrinsicintrinsic test for infringement based on the idea-expression dichotomy.
We believe that the Arnstein court was doing nearly the same thing. But
the fact that it may not have been does not subtract from our analysis.”142
Scholars noted a substantial difference between the Second and Ninth
Circuit tests.143 Whereas under Arnstein misappropriation takes place in
one step, the Ninth Circuit’s “extrinsic/intrinsic” test splits Arnstein into
two.144 Plaintiffs must prove substantial similarity under both prongs:
first, the “extrinsic . . . filtering” of uncopyrightable elements and
comparison of copyrightable features, and second, “intrinsic”
requirement that an ordinary, reasonable observer viewing the works as
a whole would perceive the allegedly infringing work to be substantially
similar to the plaintiff's work in “total concept and feel.”145 It has proven
difficult for courts to apply.146 The extrinsic step’s focus on similarity in
ideas is also odd, given that copyright does not protect ideas. 147 The
Fourth and Eighth Circuits adopted the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic
test, with the Fourth Circuit refining the second step further by assuming
the perspective of the “intended audience” of the work as opposed to the
general public—language that seems similar to the refined ordinary
observer test and therefore similarly problematic for the plaintiff.148
3. The Abstraction/Filtration/Comparison Test
The
third
test
for
substantial
similarity
is
the
“abstraction/filtration/comparison” test, which the Second Circuit
141. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164–65.
142. Id. at 1165 n.7.
143. See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 8, at 610 (“The Second and Ninth Circuits differ
substantially.”).
144. See id. (comparing Arnstein’s single “improper appropriation” step to the Ninth
Circuit’s “‘extrinsic’ test aimed at determining whether there exists a substantial similarity in
underlying ideas” and “‘intrinsic’ test to ascertain whether there exists a substantial similarity in
the expression of the underlying idea” (quoting Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,
648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986))); see also id. (“The first step, under the Ninth Circuit’s
Krofft test, ‘is focused on a dissective analysis of similarities and differences in expression in the
works at issue.’” (quoting Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1830)).
145. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cavalier v.
Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002)), overruled in part by Skidmore v. Led
Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
146. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 92, § 3:2.1[H] (“The application of the extrinsic
test . . . is a somewhat unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent . . . .” (quoting Swirsky
v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004))).
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea . . . .”).
148. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733–36 (4th Cir. 1990); OSTERBERG
& OSTERBERG, supra note 92, §§ 3:2.1–2.3.
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devised to evaluate cases involving computer software.149 Decades after
Arnstein, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,150 the
Second Circuit noted that while Arnstein is useful “when the material
under scrutiny [is] limited to art forms readily comprehensible and
generally familiar to the average lay person,” the “highly complicated and
technical subject matter at the heart of [nonliteral software] claims” called
for a different approach because the internal designs of computer
programs were “likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay observers.”151
The test first identifies elements copyright does not protect, using an
abstraction step—from the general idea to the precise words, images, or
sounds used in the work.152 The second step filters out these elements,
and the third step compares protected aspects of both works.153 Each step
requires the fact finder to dissect what is protectable and what is not, and
expert testimony may be relevant in all three steps.154
In Altai, a dispute arose out of two functionally similar computer
programs developed by different companies.155 The Second Circuit
parsed the software into its parts: source and object code, parameter lists,
services required, and outlines.156 It then removed nonprotected parts,
those either in the public domain or that constituted an idea rather than
an expression of an idea, such as the link set in the desktop taskbar.157
Finally, the court compared the remaining expressive elements of the
plaintiff’s program and found no copying of protectable elements.158
William Patry criticized the abstraction/filtration/comparison test as
“the most complicated copyright ‘test’ ever conceived” that misses
essential holistic elements of artistic works by the “ravage[s]” of elementby-element analysis.159 Others questioned its usefulness when applied to
other works of authorship.160 While most circuits reserve this test for
149. See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–11 (2d Cir. 1992).
150. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
151. Id. at 713.
152. See id. at 706–07.
153. Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996); Altai,
982 F.2d at 710 (“Once a court has sifted out all the elements of the allegedly infringed program
which are ‘ideas’ or are dictated by efficiency or external factors, or taken from the public domain,
there may remain a core protectable expression. In terms of a work’s copyright value, this is the
golden nugget.”).
154. Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1838.
155. Altai, 982 F.2d at 698–700.
156. See id. at 714.
157. See id. at 707, 715.
158. Id. at 715, 721.
159. 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:94, Westlaw (database updated Sept.
2020).
160. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression
Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 698 (1999) (“[O]ne cannot
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computer software cases, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits reportedly apply it
to all copyright works.161
In sum, unlike in typical circuit splits, circuits appear divided less by
the proper policy goals of substantial similarity and more by the
mechanics of operationalizing those goals. According to the modern
substantial similarity tests, courts are correct to filter out unprotected
elements of the plaintiff’s work since defendants can only infringe on
“protected expression.”162 In doing so, courts must take care to allow
copyrightable combinations of otherwise unprotectable elements.163 Only
then do defendants need to show they independently created the allegedly
infringing work, or that the amount of the protectable material used was
so trivial that the law should regard it as a noninfringing de minimis
use.164 Plaintiffs are forced to use this morass of unclear precedent to
convince courts that defendants have taken only copyrightable content,
which, as Section II.B shows, would combine with pretrial motion
practice to create a structural bias against them.
Circuit courts disagree on how to apply these tests.165 If courts
struggle to implement their tests, and if both creators and users cannot
predictably judge their legal positions, the time may now be ripe for the
Supreme Court to step in and finally introduce a nationwide test.166 In the
meantime, judges, scholars, and practitioners continue to lack the
knowledge to meaningfully reform substantial similarity because many
of its most important facets are hidden and are revealed only empirically.
Every case is fact-specific, eliding rote application of formulaic or
mechanistic rules; stepping back to see how the pieces from many cases
fit together reveals significant trends and truths.

divide a visual work into neat layers of abstraction in precisely the same manner one could with
a text.”).
161. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 92, §§ 3:3.1–3.2.
162. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1099, 1101–
02 (7th Cir. 2017).
164. See, e.g., VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
165. See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 8, at 688–89 (“[E]ven within a single circuit, courts
sometimes vary the test used depending on the type of work at issue (e.g., software vs. visual
art).”).
166. Roodhuyzen, supra note 10, at 1418–19; see also id. at 1377 (“As the tests become
increasingly elusive for both courts and litigants, it is important to consider whether there should
be one single test articulated by the Supreme Court, or rather, whether there should be a test at
all.”).
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C. Looking Under the Hood
In trademark infringement cases, judges routinely rely on a
remarkably limited number of factors in reaching their conclusions.167
They employ heuristics—such as the three substantial similarity tests—
to cut through what would otherwise be a morass of information that
could paralyze decision-making entirely.168 This, however, makes it
difficult to draw broader conclusions that inform future cases
coherently.169 To address this, scholars employ case content analysis to
parse through court decisions and study how judges and juries apply rules
to facts in practice.170
This Article employs case content analysis, relying on an expansive
pool of cases based on a Westlaw search for all intellectual property law
cases discussing substantial similarity between 2010 and 2019.171 The
search returned 285 unfiltered decisions. After filtering out trademark or
patent cases, as well as copyright cases mentioning but not discussing
substantial similarity, the final pool comprised 242 cases.172 The dataset
of hand-coded cases include the decision’s date; the judicial circuit;
whether the case repeated; its procedural posture; the type of work of
authorship; substantial similarity tests and their limitations; whether a
district or appellate court decided the case; case outcomes; the identity of
167. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1602 (2006) (“The data collected for this study support
both the general hypothesis that decision makers, even when making complex decisions, consider
only a small number of factors and the more specific hypothesis that, in doing so, decision makers
use a core attributes heuristic.”).
168. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Retooling the Patent-Antitrust Intersection: Insights from
Behavioral Economics, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 124, 175 (2017).
169. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, The (Unnoticed) Revitalization of The Doctrine of Equivalents,
ST. JOHN’S LAW REV. (forthcoming 2021).
170. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1371, 1380 (2010) (“Content analysis is capable of helping scholars verify, analyze, or
refute empirical claims about case law, and it is to that purpose the approach is put in this study.”).
For earlier studies where others and I employed a similar methodology, see DARYL LIM, PATENT
MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAW 10 (2013); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content
Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77–79 (2008); Daryl Lim, Judging
Equivalents, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 223, 230 (2020); Lee Petherbridge et al., The
Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293,
1303–04 (2011).
171. See WESTLAW, next.westlaw.com (search the following terms: “adv: SY,DI (substantial
/3 similarity)”; then narrow search results to cases between 2010 and 2019; then narrow search
results to the “Intellectual Property” practice area). For other studies employing a similar
methodology, see, for example, John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 (2007) (“[W]e collected every district
court and court of appeals decision on the doctrine of equivalents that appeared in Westlaw . . . .”).
172. If the opinion discussed the relevant law and facts, it was included in the database, even
absent a specific heading.
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appellate judges and district courts; and the parties’ relationship as rivals
(or not).
In 2013, Katherine Lippman published a student comment reporting
on a more limited set of variables in substantial similarity caselaw.173 The
Lippman study reported on appellate cases between 1923 and 2011 and
district court opinions that resulted in reported appeals.174 This had the
unfortunate consequence of omitting a significant number of district court
opinions which were not appealed—between 80%–90% of all district
court cases are never appealed.175 Nonetheless, a large number of cases
in the Lippman study (234) provides a useful basis for comparison,176 and
leading copyright scholars have cited the study’s results with approval.177
This Article builds on the Lippman study and significantly refines it.
Using an original hand-coded dataset, in addition to all appellate cases
between 2010 and 2019, this Article reports on all district court opinions
during that period, regardless of whether parties appealed. This Article
also introduces other vital refinements, including distinguishing between
procedural wins (for instance, defeating a motion for summary judgment)
and substantive wins (which result in a finding of infringement or
noninfringement) based on substantial similarity. Other refinements are
the interactions between similarity, rivalry and fair use, and interactions
between outcomes and the circuit standards employed (and their
limitations).178
Substantial similarity—like patent law’s doctrine of equivalents and
trademark law’s multifactor likelihood of confusion test—uses nonliteral
analysis to determine infringement in the sense that the offending article
need not be identical to the plaintiff’s work of authorship, invention, or
sign.179 The three types of intellectual property rights are, of course, also
173. Lippman, supra note 8, at 516.
174. Id. at 535. Lippman picked the year 1923 because of Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F.
959 (2d Cir. 1923), which she regarded as “the oldest case” the substantial similarity test traced
its roots to. Id. at 549; see also Eric Rogers, Comment, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical
Examination of Copyright Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 896 (“This Note builds upon Lippman’s work by assigning ‘hard numbers’
to the results of substantial similarity cases at the appellate level, while determining how selected
variables influence case outcomes.”).
175. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further
Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 659–60
(2004).
176. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 535.
177. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994–2014, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 1065, 1070 n.13 (2016); Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in Copyright
Law, 102 IOWA L. REV. 605, 621 nn.70, 72 (2017); Avani Mehta Sood, Attempted Justice:
Misunderstanding and Bias in Psychological Constructions of Criminal Attempt, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 593, 673 n.302 (2019).
178. See infra Part II.
179. See infra notes 214, 297 and accompanying text. Professor Sarnoff provided this insight.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3

616

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

different in significant ways. With substantial similarity, courts
determine what is copyrighted and what is copied jointly. In contrast,
patent law’s doctrine of equivalents helps ensure the patent scope is
commensurate with what patentees ought to receive in their claims. And
trademark law focuses on the similarity of plaintiffs’ and defendants’
marks and on defendants’ willful infringement in determining the
likelihood of confusion.180 Nonetheless, like in zoology, knowing how a
member of an animal species behaves and why it has resisted the decline
seen in other species in the same genus can help broaden one’s
understanding of the law beyond niche areas and promote crossfertilization of insights. This Article discusses these insights in Part III.
For this Article, Excel was initially used to hand-code the data before
converting it to IBM SPSS Statistics to generate the graphs and crosstabs.
Like all empirical studies, this one has its caveats. There are several wellrecognized limitations to case content study databases. First, coding may
result in incomplete or inaccurate coding, despite cross-coding and
verification using a population sample.181 Given, however, that the focus
is on features of written decisions, the data remain valid as long as they
are recognized to refer to a specific population rather than a sample of all
cases in all possible worlds.182 Second, legal databases such as Westlaw
are known to underreport jury decisions.183 To some degree, comparing
this study to others that employ similar methods to control for that feature
can mitigate it.
Like earlier empirical studies employing the case content analysis
method, this study avoids regression analysis because “invariance
produces enormous regression coefficients and standard errors that
severely limit the utility of the regression results.”184 Instead, this Article
employs the Fisher Exact Test for contingency tables to test the null
hypothesis that a case attribute is independent of case outcome.185 This
contingency table approach is more appropriate than regression because
180. See infra Section III.A–B; Beebe, supra note 167, at 1582 (stating that in trademark
law, a finding that the similarity of the marks factor that does not result in a likelihood of confusion
is dispositive).
181. See, e.g., Lim, supra note 169.
182. Id.
183. Allison & Lemley, supra note 171, at 963–64 (“The universe of all decisions is of course
different from the universe of those reported in Westlaw, and in particular our study underreports
jury decisions. But our focus on written decisions (both reported and unreported) allows us to
parse the grounds for decision and the reasoning of the opinions.”).
184. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 167, at 1600 & n.85 (noting “[r]egression analysis is
inappropriate” for these studies, raising “the problem of ‘zero cell count’ in which the dependent
variable, here, the outcome of the multifactor test, is invariant for one or more values of an
independent variable”).
185. See Appendix (June 2020), https://bit.ly/SPSSdataset_June2020 [https://perma.cc/
7TMF-QT7K].
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the outcomes and attributes are all categorical variables. Furthermore, the
Fisher Exact Test is more relevant than a chi-squared test because many
of the cells have expected counts less than five.186 This study calculates
Monte Carlo p-values with 50,000 samples. Finally, the reported data are
kept to whole numbers without decimal places, following the convention
in other empirical studies.187
Analysis of judicial opinions has well-known limitations.188 Statistics
fail to account for extralegal factors influencing judging, such as
summary affirmances, the state of the record on appeal, and judicial
deliberations discussed in the opinion.189 Litigants may consider the
expertise and reputation of the district court judge in deciding whether to
appeal, introducing selection bias effects into the appellate data.190
Moreover, most cases settle, so decided cases are a nonrandom subset of
all cases.191
The complexity of copyright litigation also makes it difficult to
generalize, even from a study covering hundreds of cases.192 Parties are
not randomly distributed throughout the judicial districts.193 Some district
courts may hear more cases that eventually settle or were filed based on
186. See G.H. Freeman & J.H. Halton, Note on an Exact Treatment of Contingency,
Goodness of Fit and Other Problems of Significance, 38 BIOMETRIKA 141, 142, 149 (1951); Sture
Holm, A Simple Sequentially Rejective Multiple Test Procedure, 6 SCANDINAVIAN J. STAT. 65, 65
(1979).
187. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1161, 1180–82 (2010) (utilizing only whole percentages to reflect data); Ryan T. Holte
& Ted Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107, 158 tbl.4 (2019) (same); see
also TJ Cole, Too Many Digits: The Presentation of Numerical Data, 100 ARCHIVES DISEASE
CHILDHOOD 608, 609 (2015) (“The general principle is to use two or three significant digits for
effect sizes, and one or two significant digits for measures of variability.”).
188. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1128–29 (2004)
(discussing unobserved reasoning, strategic behavior, and selection bias).
189. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1899
(2009).
190. David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 243 (2008).
191. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237,
273 tbls.4 & 5, 274 tbl.6 (2006) (finding that between 65%–68% of all patent cases filed in three
particular years were resolved via settlement or probable settlement).
192. See Petherbridge, supra note 170, at 1380 (noting biases inherent in this approach, such
as “unobserved reasoning, selection bias, and strategic behavior”); David L. Schwartz, Explaining
the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1188 (2011) (“Because
patent litigation as a whole is so complex, it is incredibly complicated to develop and test
empirical models.”).
193. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 924–26, 930 (2001).
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domicile.194 Therefore, “district court judges are not assigned a random
sample . . . of patent lawsuits, because district court judges are assigned
cases from the judicial district in which they sit.”195 A particular judge or
jury may cause a case to settle, while the same case before a different
judge or jury could end up on appeal.196 This Article focuses on how
appellate and lower courts interpret precedent. Indeed, those
interpretations are not uniform and cannot ever be.197
Another limitation concerns case outcomes. The Priest-Klein
“selection hypothesis” predicts that, given various conditions, plaintiff
win rates at trials should approach 50%, because only close cases survive
settlement or summary adjudication.198 To be true, the hypothesis
assumes parties have equal stakes in the litigation.199 More recent studies,
including those dealing specifically with intellectual property law, cast
the 50% hypothesis in doubt.200 Professors Ryan Holte and Ted
Sichelman note that “changes in litigation budgets, attorney quality, and
other unobservable factors” may have changed the behavior of parties
rather than judicial decision-making.201 Moreover, technological quirks
194. See Schwartz, supra note 190, at 241–42.
195. Id. at 242.
196. See id. at 242 n.119 (“[I]f [judges] have a really tough case, they can put tremendous
pressure on the parties to settle so there won’t be an appealable order.” (alterations in original)
(quoting Eric Herman, Charting the Yays and Nays in Federal Court, CHI. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 1,
10)).
197. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Does Empirical Evidence on the Civil Justice System Produce
or Resolve Conflict?, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 636 (2016) (“[E]ven when the empirical scholars
completely agree on the underlying facts, interpretation of the results can dramatically differ.
Empirical legal scholarship is still worth conducting, but the hope that it will resolve partisan
debates in law is unrealistic.”).
198. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6, 17–18 (1984). Priest-Klein’s 50% has been modified when there are different
stakes involved, for example, if the plaintiff has more to win than the defendant has to lose. See
Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Daniel Klerman, Updating Priest and Klein 20–22 (USC Ctr. for L. & Soc.
Sci., Research Paper No. 15-21, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2619856 [https://perma.cc/LBV2-UB2H].
199. Priest & Klein, supra note 198, at 24.
200. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical
Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 339 (1990) (testing the 50% hypothesis
and rejecting it as a description of all civil litigation); see also Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V.
Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1310–12
(2003) (arguing that the Priest-Klein hypothesis is not borne out by the data in patent cases); Jason
Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in Patent Cases 5 (Univ. of Iowa
Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 12-15, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2132810 [https://perma.cc/Q38A-SNAK] (“At best, the Priest-Klein hypothesis only applies
to the selection of disputes, not the selection of individual issues. Due to the presence of multiple
issues in patent cases, there is axiomatically no basis for inferring that a patentee would expect a
fifty-percent chance of winning on each one.”).
201. See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 187, at 161.
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and the nature of the parties result in fact-specific outcomes,202 as might
many interrelated legal doctrines.203 With these caveats in mind, the
discussion turns to the theory underlying substantial similarity and to the
points of departure from conventional wisdom in practice.
II. A SILENT DEATH
Substantial similarity is in unprecedented decline. This Part describes
how and why.204 In the 1970s, plaintiffs enjoyed remarkable success,
winning 63% of cases, blowing through even the generous 50% mark.205
By the 1980s, plaintiffs won 36% of the time.206 The figure fell to 22%
between 1995 and 2000.207 Like the proverbial canary in a coalmine,
substantial similarity’s decline might have mirrored a shift in copyright
law against owners, as the Supreme Court ruled against them on an array
of issues ranging from copyrightability to fair use.208 Supreme Court
decisions over the last twenty years have favored plaintiffs in nine out of
the twelve copyright cases (although the Court did not address the
substantial similarity doctrine directly),209 with only three decisions
202. Schwartz, supra note 192, at 1187 (“For example, patent litigation between branded and
generic drug manufacturers differs from patent litigation over a business method patent held by a
non-practicing entity.”).
203. See id. at 1188 (“Changes in precedent can alter lawyers’ behavior in drafting patents.
Furthermore, changes in precedent can also influence party behavior in litigation.”).
204. This abbreviated presentation draws on the extensive analysis in Lim, supra note 33.
205. Lippman, supra note 8, at 537; see also supra Section I.C (noting that the Lippman
dataset only reports on appellate cases and district court cases with appellate opinions).
206. Lippman, supra note 8, at 538.
207. Id. at 539.
208. See id. at 540–41. Out of the five copyright decisions between 1970 and 2010, three
ruled against the plaintiff. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991)
(holding data compiled in telephone directory uncopyrightable); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) (holding that time-shifting was fair use);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994) (holding appropriation of song
elements in commercialized parody could be fair use); see also Lippman, supra note 8, at 541
(“[Campbell] may have induced a trend in substantial similarity decisions to construe the
boundaries of infringement more liberally, absolving more alleged infringers from liability and
impacting the decline in substantial similarity win rates through the mid-1990s.”); cf. Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (holding that unauthorized
publication of verbatim excerpts from unpublished memoirs were not fair use); Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207, 235–36 (1990) (holding that statutory successors were entitled to renewal rights,
though the author previously assigned them to another party).
209. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 487–88 (2001) (preventing publishers of
periodicals from relicensing individual articles to databases absent transfer of copyright or any
rights thereunder from authors of individual articles); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194
(2003) (holding Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 constitutional); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (holding distributors of device promoting
infringement liable for third parties’ infringing acts); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.
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favoring defendants.210 This should have been a boom time for plaintiffs;
it was anything but.
Plaintiffs won a trifling 11% of cases in the district courts between
2010 and 2019 (compared to 24% between 1923 and 2011) and 0% on
appeal between 2010 and 2019 (compared to 32% between 1923 and
2011).211 Plaintiff win rates on procedure were higher—23% (in district
court), but only for successfully fending off a defendant’s motion to
dismiss or summary judgment motion.212 Procedural wins on appeal in
favor of plaintiffs were at 3%.213 Plaintiff win rates in recent substantial
similarity cases are meager compared to plaintiff nonliteral infringement
win rates of 24% in doctrine of equivalence cases (in district court) and
22% (on appeal).214 They are even lower compared to plaintiff win rates
in civil litigation, recently around 30%.215
A. Three Red Herrings
Currently, plaintiffs struggle to prove copyright infringement in a way
never before seen. Neither the tests courts apply, the circuits they reside
in, nor the works at issue adequately account for this startling finding.

154, 157 (2010) (holding that registration requirement does not restrict federal court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction for infringement suits involving unregistered works); Golan v. Holder, 565
U.S. 302, 306–08 (2012) (holding that protection for preexisting works of Berne member
countries in country of origin, but not in the United States, is constitutional); Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 436 (2014) (holding that provider that sold subscribers broadcast
television programming streamed over the Internet from small antennas infringed copyright);
Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667 (2014) (denying a defense of laches
for damages claims brought within the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations);
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1983 (2016) (holding that a district court
awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing party should give substantial weight to reasonableness of
losing party’s position); Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017)
(holding that a feature in a useful article is eligible for copyright protection and setting out the test
for eligibility).
210. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 525 (2013) (“We hold that the
‘first sale’ doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad.”); Rimini St.,
Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2019) (holding that federal district courts can award
“full costs” to party in copyright litigation only in six categories of costs specified by Congress);
Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886–87 (2019) (holding
that a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit when the Copyright Office registers
a copyright, not when an owner submits application, materials, and registration fee to the Office).
211. See Appendix, supra note 185; see also Lippman, supra note 8, at 555 (noting the
decrease in plaintiff-favorable holdings, especially on appeal).
212. See Appendix, supra note 185.
213. See Appendix, supra note 185.
214. See Lim, supra note 169.
215. See Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident of the Falling Win
Rate: Individual vs System-Level Justification and the Rule of Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1371,
1373 (2019) (tracking plaintiff win rates in civil litigation).
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Instead, this Article identifies two factors contributing to this trend:
pretrial motions and nonrival defendants.
1. Variances Between Existing Tests?
Given the controversy surrounding the existing tests one might expect
stark variances in plaintiff win rates between them.216 After all, courts
have shown that they have no consistent way to compare two works, and
there are other points of disagreement, including whether the baseline to
assess similarity should be the original work or the accused work.217
Figure 1 (below) shows test variations across circuits (both at the
district and appellate levels), clearly establishing the ordinary observer
test’s dominance in Second Circuit courts, and the extrinsic/intrinsic
test’s dominance in Ninth Circuit courts. Most circuits track one or the
other, with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits employing both interchangeably.
Few courts used the abstraction/filtration/comparison test, and none
applied more than one test. Surprisingly, the chosen test generally made
little difference to the outcome.218 Plaintiffs were decimated regardless
of the tests courts used (see Figure 2 below), even if differences in win
rates among the application of the tests remain.

216. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 539 (“Such a significant downturn may reflect the impact
of then-recent decisions that either outlined a new test or applied an old test in a new way.”); see
also Hickey, supra note 8, at 684 (“Much commentary on substantial similarity defends one of
the existing tests as superior or proposes to replace the confused doctrine with a new standard.”).
217. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–66 (1985)
(using multiple baselines in noting that amount copied was a quantitatively “insubstantial” part of
the original work but also “13% of the infringing article”); see also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (rejecting defendants’ work as the baseline to prevent
plagiarists from “excus[ing] the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate”); cf.
Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[I]nsignificant infringement may be
substantial only if the material is qualitatively important to either [the accused] or [the original]
work.”).
218. Lippman, supra, note 8, at 544. Between 1923 and 2011, the breakdown of how often
each test was used is as follows: ordinary observer test (55%), followed by the extrinsic/intrinsic
test (28%) and the abstraction/filtration/comparison test (7%). Id.; see also id. at 546 (finding that
plaintiffs succeeded within a consistent range—the ordinary observer test (33%), the
extrinsic/intrinsic test (25%), and the abstraction/filtration/comparison test (24%)). Between 2010
and 2019, the breakdown of success rates is as follows: ordinary observer test (5%);
extrinsic/intrinsic test (2%). See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Circuits and Test Applied (2010–2019)

Figure 2: Tests and Outcomes (District Court) (2010–2019)
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2. Variances Between Circuits?
While a few circuits have made significant modifications to their
central approach, the more discerning observer test is the “dominant
approach to copyright infringement analysis today.”219 Could the fact that
the Second Circuit hears most substantial similarity cases be the reason
for the test’s demise? Intriguingly, outcomes based on circuit variations
have been remarkably consistent. Between 1923 and 2011, the Second
Circuit and Ninth Circuit reported comparable win rates at both the trial
(24% compared to 22%) and appellate levels (33% compared to 34%).220
Between 2010 and 2019, Second Circuit district courts found for
plaintiffs in 4.8% of cases, and there were no appellate cases. In the Ninth
Circuit, plaintiff win rates were 1.4% (in district court) and 8% (on
appeal), again reflecting a consistently low win rate.221
Figure 3: Outcomes by Circuit (District Courts) (2010–2019)

3. Variances Between Works of Authorship?
With copyright law covering such diverse media types and forms of
expression, substantial similarity strains at being a one-size-fits-all test.
Unsurprisingly, the literature is rich with calls for courts to better map
219. Balganesh, supra note 4, at 794, 796.
220. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 545 fig.4; see also id. at 535 (reporting that over 80% of
the appellate opinions “were issued from 1980 to 2011”).
221. See Appendix, supra note 185.
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substantial similarity tests to the type of work at issue.222 The Copyright
Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression.”223 The Act lists eight categories of protected works:
literary; musical; dramatic; pantomime and choreographic; pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural; motion picture and other audiovisual; sound
recording; and architectural.224
These categories are neither rigid nor closed. For instance, the
Copyright Act of 1790225 protected only maps, charts, and books.226
Musical compositions were routinely registered as “books” until the
Copyright Act was amended in 1831.227 When the computer industry’s
growth and profitability of mass-marketed software made illicit copying
of computer programs inexpensive, easy, and prevalent, copyright law
provided a ready solution.228 Some studies use as few as two categories,
while others use up to six categories.229 This study uses eight categories
that best reflect the types of works in the dataset: literary; musical;
pictorial, graphical, and sculptural; computer programs; factual;
architectural; dramatic; and cinematographic.
A seasoned observer of copyright cases would guess that works with
rich, expressive content, such as literary and musical works, would
receive more significant protection than databases, computer programs,
or architectural works, which are factual or functional and, therefore, lie
closer to the edge of the unprotectable ideas, scènes à faire, or the merger
doctrine discussed in Section I.B.230 Surprisingly, the data show that this
is not the case.
222. See Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1823 (“[C]ourts [should] tailor infringement tests based
on characteristics of the works at issue.”); Lieberman, supra note 9, at 93–96; Jennifer Understahl,
Note, Copyright Infringement and Poetry: When Is a Red Wheelbarrow The Red Wheelbarrow?,
58 VAND. L. REV. 915, 944 (2005); Busek, supra note 138, at 1781; David Nimmer et al., A
Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright
Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 638 (1988).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
224. Id. § 102(a)(1)–(8).
225. Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
226. See id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Copy in Copyright, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO IM/MATERIAL GOODS 65 (Jessica C. Lai & Antoinette
Maget Dominicé eds., 2016) (discussing the historical development of American copyright law).
227. WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 30 n.91 (2000), as reprinted in
DIGIT. L. ONLINE, http://digital-law-online.info/patry/patry5.html [https://perma.cc/7CAME38T].
228. Root, supra note 53, at 1291–92.
229. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 572 (2008) (looking at “new media” and “traditional twodimensional nonvirtual print media”); Rogers, supra note 174, at 926 (dividing six types of subject
matter into “high-tech subject matter” and “low-tech subject matter”).
230. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)
(“The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction
or fantasy.”).
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Figure 4 (below) shows plaintiffs had a higher percentage of wins in
literary as well as in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works than in the
other categories of works. However, a closer look reveals that there were
many more cases in these two categories of works than in the other ones.
What is more telling, therefore, is the gap between defendant and plaintiff
win rates. As Figure 5 (below) indicates, the win rates in both of those
categories are approximately the same as those in computer programs,
factual, and architectural works. Overall, plaintiffs fared abysmally with
dramatic works and did surprisingly well with cinematographic works.
Figure 4: Type of Work by Outcome (District Courts) (2010–2019)

Figure 5: Table Comparing Plaintiff Win Rates by Type of Work
(1923–2019)
Type of Work
Literary
Pic., Graph., Sculpt.
Musical
Computer Programs
Factual
Architectural
Dramatic
Cinematographic

1923–2011
Plaintiff Win Rate
(%)
20.5
52.9
21.4
30.0
39.1
8.3
Not reported
Not reported
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2010–2019
Plaintiff Win Rate (%)
13.6
11.5
0.0
12.5
11.8
11.1
0.0
28.6
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Given the demise of substantial similarity, the odds are generally
stacked against plaintiffs.231 The truth behind the high percentage of
plaintiff wins in cinematographic work is less dramatic than it appears at
first glance. The dataset reported only fourteen cases (out of 210 district
court opinions). The four cases finding in favor of plaintiffs skew the
actual likelihood of plaintiff wins. It is worth noting that, in 2010, a
leading entertainment litigator observed that copyright infringement
“claims against motion picture studios and television networks, for all
intents and purposes, are dead.”232
Putting to rest three common reasons for case outcomes merely begs
the question—what killed substantial similarity? The Lippman study
provides a critical clue. According to it, 55% of cases where the plaintiff
won were bench and jury trials.233 In contrast, it observed that only 14%
of such trials ended up favoring alleged infringers.234 Summary judgment
motions flip the picture, making up only 3% of plaintiff wins, but a
whopping 51% of defendant wins.235 The Lippman study concluded that
“a defendant-favorable district court decision finding that the works are
not substantially similar is less likely to be overturned on appeal because,
in most cases, that decision was made at the summary judgment stage;
and, presumably, the case is weak or frivolous.”236
While plausible, concluding that pretrial motion dismissals equate to
plaintiffs bringing weak or frivolous cases is unsatisfying. The fact is, at
least as a matter of litigation burden, defendants have it easier. They need
only show that plaintiffs failed to make out their case on the pleadings,
specifically a lack of substantial similarity, for instance, through the
copying of unprotected elements. By contrast, plaintiffs must satisfy a
gamut of factual and legal issues to prevail. Moreover, the evidentiary
requirements under summary judgment are lower than at trial. A more
robust answer therefore needs to consider how courts make substantial
similarity determinations.
Over the years, courts and commentators continued to praise the
centrality of juries.237 In theory, this would safeguard plaintiffs against
231. Lippman, supra note 8, at 522 (observing a “concern that case law is sharply skewed in
favor of the defendants”).
232. Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, L.A. LAW., Nov. 2010, at 32, 32; see also
Lippman, supra note 8, at 520–21 (“In the last twenty years, all forty-eight copyright infringement
lawsuits against motion picture studios and television networks within the Second and Ninth
Circuits and their district courts resulted in defendant victories.”).
233. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 556.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 557 (footnote omitted).
237. See Loren & Reese, supra note 1, at 646 (“Substantial similarity is a question of fact.”);
Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 319,
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defendants seeking quick disposal of the case on a motion to dismiss or
summary judgment motion.238 This Article reveals a surprising
partnership in practice between judges and defendants formed to usurp
the jury’s role.
B. Judicial Usurpers
Unlawful appropriation rests on the plaintiff’s protectable expression
and the relevant public’s impression—for whose benefit copyright exists
in the first place.239 For this reason, Arnstein placed juries at the center of
its test for substantial similarity.240 Part I emphasizes that a jury is
“peculiarly fitted to determine” the response of the lay hearer.241
At the same time, defendants may bring motions for summary
judgment, inviting judges to make favorable and expedient
determinations.242 When this happens, judges may rule on substantial
similarity as a matter of law if defendants offer sufficient evidence in their
pleadings that no reasonable jury could find unlawful appropriation.243
Courts have also extended this practice to defendants’ motions to

351 (2013) (“[A] showing of substantial similarity is a question of fact . . . .”); see also Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that summary judgment is “not highly
favored” on questions of substantial similarity in copyright cases (quoting Narell v. Freeman, 872
F.2d 907, 909–10 (9th Cir. 1989))), overruled by Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th
Cir. 2020) (en banc); Oren Bracha & John M. Golden, Redundancy and Anti-Redundancy in
Copyright, 51 CONN. L. REV. 247, 275 (2019) (“[T]he substantial similarity standard . . . is applied
case by case and often by juries . . . .”); Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp.,
602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[Q]uestions of non-infringement have traditionally been reserved
for the trier of fact.”).
238. See, e.g., TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(denying motion to dismiss copyright claim against defendant who used the lyrical phrase and
recording “say what” sampled from plaintiff’s song); Herzog v. Castle Rock Ent., 193 F.3d 1241,
1247 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts historically have been reluctant to make subjective
determinations in copyright cases regarding the similarity between two works on summary
judgment); Osterberg, supra note 51.
239. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds
by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Balganesh, supra
note 4, at 794 (“[C]ourts around the country take their guidance on the copyright infringement
analysis from a landmark decision of the Second Circuit that is believed to have defined the
structure of the infringement inquiry and the jury’s role in it . . . .”).
240. See supra Section I.B.
241. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
242. See, e.g., Boone v. Jackson, 206 F. App’x 30, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of defendant for the use of lyrical phrase “Holla Back” and noting deposition
testimony that contradicted plaintiff’s prior assertions).
243. See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding
summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity).
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dismiss.244 In an astonishing 62% of cases, judges readily accepted a
defendant’s invitation to rule on substantial similarity on one motion or
the other without an iota of jury input.245
Figure 6: Posture by Outcome (2010–2019)

This finding eviscerates conventional wisdom that juries command
the outcome of infringement cases.246 Figure 7 (below) shows the
devastating impact of defendant pretrial motions on plaintiff win rates.
Plaintiffs prevail about 40% of the time when they bring a pretrial motion,
compared to 74% when defendants bring a summary judgment motion,
and 76% on a motion to dismiss.247 In the mid-1980s, plaintiff win rates
fell as the practice became comparatively more prevalent.248 Surely,
[t]his result raises the possibility that summary judgment on
the substantial similarity issue may actually decrease the
244. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir.
2010) (noting that, when evaluating substantial similarity on a motion to dismiss, “no discovery
or fact-finding is typically necessary, because ‘what is required is only a visual [or aural]
comparison of the works’” (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d
Cir. 1991))).
245. See Appendix, supra note 185.
246. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 4, at 796–97 (describing Arnstein as giving “juries
complete control over the question of improper appropriation in the infringement analysis”).
247. See Appendix, supra note 185.
248. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 554; see also id. at 557 (“[A]n increase in summary
adjudications coincides with a decline in the frequency of trials, but it also corresponds to a
decrease in substantial similarity win rates.”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss3/3

38

Lim: Saving Substantial Similarity

2021]

SAVING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY

629

likelihood that a copyright holder will prevail due to the fact
that the proper test for substantial similarity—which
“requires the response of the ordinary lay observer,” not the
judge—is not applied.249
In theory, the move from cases based on the earlier Copyright Act of
1909250 may have influenced case outcomes. However, nothing in
scholarly commentary indicates a material difference in the test courts
applied. For instance, contemporary cases continued to apply Arnstein,
decided in 1946, without distinguishing between the relevant Acts.251
An important related question is whether there are circuit variances in
this trend. Professor Robert Helfing anecdotally observes this practice in
the context of the Second and Ninth Circuits. Professor Helfing notes that
the Second Circuit “has loosened the reins and expressly authorized the
summary resolution of claims on the basis of a judge’s emotional
response to works of authorship.”252 In contrast, “The Ninth Circuit has
been mostly faithful to this judicial restraint.”253 Figure 8 (below) shows
that Professor Helfing is only partially correct. The Second Circuit
granted defendants’ summary judgments and motions to dismiss in 67%
of its caseload.254 In comparison, the Ninth Circuit did so in 66% of its
caseload.255
Figure 7: Circuit by Posture (2010–2019)

249. See Lippman, supra note 8, at 557 (quoting Julie J. Bisceglia, Summary Judgment on
Substantial Similarity in Copyright Actions, 16 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 51, 55–56
(1993)).
250. Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
251. See supra Section I.B.
252. Helfing, supra note 10, at 764.
253. Id.
254. See Appendix, supra note 185.
255. See Appendix, supra note 185.
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It is unlikely that judges intend to impede plaintiffs’ right of access to
jury trials, but a finding of evidentiary insufficiency blocks the route
nonetheless. Judges engaging in this practice usually begin with the
mantra that “a court may make a finding of non-infringement as a matter
of law on summary judgment if the similarity between the works
concerns only non-copyrightable elements, or if no reasonable jury,
properly instructed, would find as to the protectable elements that the two
works are substantially similar,”256 and then summarily proceed to do
so.257 Courts themselves have framed this practice as proper as long as a
court has before it all that is necessary to make such an evaluation.258
To justify this usurpation of substantial similarity cases, some judges
touted their expertise. As one judge put it, substantial similarity “is often
more reliably and accurately resolved in a summary judgment
proceeding. This is so because a judge is better able to separate original
expression from the non-original elements of a work where the copying
of the latter is not protectable and the copying of the former is
protectable.”259 Another judge declared that “the ‘substantial-similarity’
256. Architects Collective v. Pucciano & English, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1343 (N.D.
Ga. 2017).
257. See, e.g., Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Although this
question typically should be left to the factfinder, summary judgment may be appropriate if the
court can conclude, after viewing the evidence and drawing inferences in a manner most favorable
to the nonmoving party, that no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity . . . .” (footnote
omitted)); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1983)
(“[S]ummary judgment for defendant is appropriate where works are so dissimilar that a claim of
infringement is without merit.”); Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes Inc., 825
F.3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e stand by the core premise that judges can, in certain
cases, remove the question of substantial similarity from jury consideration.”).
258. See Lombardo v. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 279 F. Supp. 3d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(“Numerous courts in this district have resolved the issue of fair use on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings by conducting a side-by-side comparison of the works at issue.”), aff’d, 729 F.
App’x 131 (2d Cir. 2018); Klauber Bros. v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 557 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir.
2014) (observing how courts routinely decide the issue of substantial similarity as a matter of
law); see also Wager v. Littell, 549 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that though the
issue of substantial similarity is frequently a fact issue for jury resolution, “the issue can be
decided as a matter of law, even at the pleading stage, by examining the four corners of the
complaint together with the works themselves when ‘no reasonable jury, properly instructed,
could find that the two works’ are strikingly similar.” (quoting Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC
v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2010))); Peter F. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 63 (“[I]t
is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as a matter of law, ‘either because
the similarity between two works concerns only non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s
work, or because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are
substantially similar.’” (quoting Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir.
1983))).
259. Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Est. Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 920 (11th Cir.
2008); see also Lieberman, supra note 9, at 94 (“[J]urors are not likely to understand such an
ephemeral distinction between ideas and expression, especially when applied to areas in which
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test is more often correctly administered by a judge rather than a jury—
even one provided proper instruction.”260
What is the basis of that conclusion? Perhaps judges hear copyright
infringement cases with some regularity and develop an expertise. The
Supreme Court approved this line of reasoning in patent claim
construction by giving judges, rather than juries, the benefit of
determining the scope of rights.261 Another reason may be that judges
rendering opinions and setting out their reasoning allow for more
substantive accountability than a binary jury verdict finding for one party
or the other.262 In the context of patent infringement cases, the Supreme
Court expressed concerns “over unreviewability due to black-box jury
verdicts.”263 As a form of “procedural improvement[],” it encouraged
district courts to grant summary judgment for the defendant where “no
reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent,” or where
“legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of equivalents are to
be determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial
summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.”264
Unfortunately, this Article reveals that these justifications are generally
unsubstantiated.
1. The Mirage of Accountability
On the issue of accountability, scholars have criticized judges for
using an “I know it when I see it” means to determine substantial
similarity and have argued that judges should set out for the record their
reasoning in detail.265 Some courts have defended this practice. One judge
recently expressed that “[t]he Court need not explain in its analysis every
alleged similarity in a copyright infringement case and may properly
disregard alleged similarities that are not protectable.”266
Substantial similarity turns on inherently subjective appreciation of a
work’s tone and feel. Resolving it as a matter of law risks one judge’s
subjective opinion trumping the evidence. Courts may even conclude

they lack expertise, as is often the case with copyright. Because the issue of misappropriation is
so dependent on the interpretation of these underlying principles of copyright law, classifying the
issue as purely a question of fact for the jury requires reconsideration.” (footnote omitted)).
260. Intervest Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d at 920.
261. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388, 391 (1996) (describing
how precedent would not undercut the deciding Justice’s authority).
262. See Lim, supra note 169.
263. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997).
264. Id. On the doctrine of equivalents, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1162 (2004).
265. E.g., Roodhuyzen, supra note 10, at 1376–77.
266. Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d, 821 F.
App’x 727 (9th Cir. 2020).
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substantial similarity when comparing two works and use the formalistic
tests to support their decisions ex post.267
A recent study on substantial similarity employing a behavioral
economics framework shows that courts are sensitive to information
about the two works and their creators in a way that “actively distorts”
their “assessments of the similarity between the two works, calling into
question the purported objectivity of the substantial similarity
requirement as a whole.”268 Even within a single circuit, courts
employing the same test can reach vastly different conclusions, as the two
examples below illustrate.
First, in Copeland v. Bieber,269 the Fourth Circuit had to determine if
Justin Bieber and Usher’s song “Somebody to Love” was substantially
similar to the plaintiff’s song with the same name.270 The district court
concluded that while Bieber and Usher’s song had “some elements in
common” with the plaintiff’s song, there was a significant difference in
the overall “aesthetic appeal” of the respective songs.271 The appellate
court disagreed because “that analysis attaches too much weight to what
the district court termed a difference in ‘mood’ and ‘tone,’ and too little
to similarities between the ‘element’ of the songs—their choruses—that
is most important.”272
According to the appellate court, by allowing genre differences to
preclude intrinsic similarity, defendants could profit from unlicensed
adaptations solely because the work had a different “concept and feel”
than the original, with a different “aesthetic appeal.”273 This would
deprive plaintiffs of the full return on their creative efforts in light of what
the statute prohibits as infringing conduct that is not fair use.274 The
appellate court also faulted the district court for failing to account for
qualitatively significant similarities, declaring “it is clear that when it
comes to popular music, a song’s chorus may be the kind of key sequence
that can give rise to intrinsic similarity, even when works differ in other
respects.”275 It proceeded to “conclude that their choruses are similar
enough and also significant enough that a reasonable jury could find the
songs intrinsically similar.”276 The problem with this conclusion,
267. See Zahr K. Said, Reforming Copyright Interpretation, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469,
473–75, 522 (2015) (noting a “great divergence in outcomes and reasoning . . . in infringement
analysis” and criticizing judges’ “intuitive” approach).
268. See Balganesh et al., supra note 3, at 267.
269. 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015).
270. Id. at 487.
271. Id. at 492.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 493.
274. See id. at 493.
275. Id. at 493–94.
276. Id. at 494.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss3/3

42

Lim: Saving Substantial Similarity

2021]

SAVING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY

633

however, is that juries, not judges, most closely approximate pop music’s
typical audience.
Second, in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.,277 both the district and
appellate courts applied Ninth Circuit precedent for substantial similarity
to computer code.278 Google copied the thirty-seven Java application
protocol interfaces (APIs), which Java programmers are required to use
as a standard requirement for interoperability.279 The district court ruled
that, since the code was a functional standard the merger doctrine barred
at the time Google copied the code, there was no infringement.280 It also
emphasized that Google copied very little code in the context of the
original work.281
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision because the code involved creative choices when it was
written.282 The Federal Circuit also emphasized the total amount copied
as an absolute matter, referring to the “7,000 lines” of code Google
copied.283 The view one takes on the issue matters. Critics of the Federal
Circuit’s approach warn that it “threatens the public’s right to the free
flow of ideas, the balance at the core of copyright.”284 The view is neither
that of the original creator nor the alleged infringer but rather the
objective observer (under any of the three substantial similarity tests or
under additional tests that would not be based on ordinary observers).
Indeed, the questionable perspective that the district court and court of
appeals took only serves to underscore how treacherous this inquiry is.

277. 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
278. Id. at 1357–58. The district court discussed the principles of the filtration step of the
abstraction/filtration/comparison test but did not reach the infringement issue directly. See id. at
1358, 1377.
279. Id. at 1350.
280. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(“All agree that Google was and remains free to use the Java language itself.”), rev’d, 750 F.3d
1339.
281. Id. at 1001; see also Hickey, supra note 8, at 713 (“In fact, 3% was a generous estimate:
as both Android and the Java platform writ large contain millions of lines of code, the amount
copied is quantitatively infinitesimal regardless of which work is used as the measure.”).
282. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1361 (“We further find that the district court erred in focusing
its merger analysis on the options available to Google at the time of copying. It is well-established
that copyrightability and the scope of protectable activity are to be evaluated at the time of
creation . . . . The focus is, therefore, on the options that were available to Sun/Oracle at the time
it created the API packages.”); see also Hickey, supra note 8, at 704 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s
approach to the timing problem essentially determined the outcome in Oracle.”).
283. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1356, 1359, 1363.
284. Hickey, supra note 8, at 724 (“It goes against the core constitutional purpose of
‘promot[ing] . . . [p]rogress’ for copyright to lock up something as general as an idea, regardless
of when it attained that status.” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
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2. Efficiency vs. Effectiveness
The second reason judges encourage pretrial motions is efficiency.
Resources are scarce, and courts justify the need to dispose of cases
quickly and effectively.285 This way, a trial judge can intercept an issue
before it gets to the jury.286 As one court put it, a court “not only has the
discretion, but is in fact required to grant summary adjudication in any
case where no reasonable fact finder could find equivalence even if
equivalence is a factual matter normally reserved for the jury.”287 With
judges intermingling patent and copyright jurisprudence over the years,
it would be unsurprising that copyright judges have also adopted the
practice of patent judges in embracing pretrial motions.288
However, efficiency may come at a dire cost to effectiveness because
it is impossible for judges to ever see substantial similarity through the
eyes of a jury. The jury’s factual determination is a safety valve to guard
against judges cloistered in their courtrooms, becoming arbiters of public
perception. This judicial usurpation breeds precisely the sort of
arbitrariness that both courts and copyright scholars complain of.
Professor Suja Thomas’s work shows divisions between courts will
be frequent whenever courts substitute their judgment of the facts for a
jury verdict.289 Judges look at what a single juror would find and thus fail
to replicate the hive mind of an actual jury; they are unable to account for
the group decision-making dynamics.290 Professor Thomas concluded
that judges who attempt to decide dispositive motions based on their
preconception of what a reasonable jury would find fail and instead
splinter legal certainty.291
The need for accountability becomes even more evident when one
realizes that almost every judge approaches substantial similarity as a
285. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (“Summary judgment procedure
is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); see also Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[C]ases . . . permit[] courts to put ‘a swift end
to meritless litigation’ and to avoid lengthy and costly trials.” (quoting Quinn v. Syracuse Model
Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980))).
286. PrinterOn Inc. v. BreezyPrint Corp., 93 F. Supp. 3d 658, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(“Although infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a fact question, a court may
determine as a matter of law that the ‘all limitations’ rule, the prior art, or prosecution history
estoppel preclude the claim.”).
287. Dahl v. Swift Distribs., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
288. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932
(2005) (adopting patent law’s contributory infringement jurisprudence).
289. See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760
(2009).
290. Id. at 770–73.
291. See id. at 784.
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matter of first impression. This Article’s original dataset revealed that
each judge heard an average of one case per decade.292 District court
numbers are only marginally better. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York has the most significant level of expertise
in substantial similarity. It heard 31% of all district court cases.293 The
next highest figure, at a distant 7%, came from the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, and not from any district court in the Ninth
Circuit.294 However, even in the Southern District of New York, each
judge heard less than two cases per decade.295
The nation’s de facto test is Arnstein’s ordinary observer test.296
Regardless of judge or jury, substantial similarity needs reform to allow
both lay juries and judges, who likely will encounter it as a matter of first
impression, to operate effectively. The urgent need for reform only
increases when one considers that judges, probably overwhelmed by the
difficulty of applying the tests, alarmingly rely on economic similarities
rather than technical similarities to dispose of the cases before them.
Section II.C discusses this issue.
C. The Hidden Impact of Fair Use
The Supreme Court described fair use—a defense to infringement—
as providing a guarantee of “breathing space within the confines of
copyright,” and it acts as a policy lever for courts to avoid the harshness
of finding infringement when the circumstances demand it.297 Substantial
similarity and fair use have much in common.298 Both operate as common
law doctrines even though Congress provided a statutory basis for fair
use in the Copyright Act.299 Both present courts with the challenge of
292. See Appendix, supra note 185.
293. See Appendix, supra note 185.
294. See Appendix, supra note 185.
295. See Appendix, supra note 185.
296. See supra Section II.A.
297. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Ann Bartow,
A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
457, 471 (2014) (describing how Campbell is the Court’s “most important nonliteral copying fair
use case” and how it “dial[ed] back the importance of commercial use in a fair use evaluation”).
298. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1459, 1480 (“The basic test of substantial similarity for infringement—which is vital for the public
to evaluate whether its conduct is permissible—is, unfortunately, ‘largely subjective, thus
permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive judgment of the perceived equities in a
case.’ And, of course, the fair use doctrine is notoriously fact-specific, leaving little guidance for
users of copyrighted works on whether a particular use is fair.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
Litman, supra note 8, at 1005)).
299. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (stipulating exclusive rights are granted “[s]ubject to” fair
use); Balganesh, supra note 8, at 215 (“Unlike fair use, which today finds mention in the
Copyright Act of 1976, substantial similarity continues to remain a doctrine that is policed,
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applying a single standard across a wide array of works, from software to
architectural designs.300 Under both analyses, courts consider the purpose
the defendant seeks to achieve, the harm its copying causes the plaintiff,
and whether the defendant’s copying amounts to misappropriation.301
Both fair use and substantial similarity are arbitrary, anecdotal, and
misunderstood.302
Most relevant for this Article, however, is the fact that both are
entrenched in utilitarianism.303 The second fair use factor requires courts
to examine the “nature of the copyrighted work.”304 In contrast, the third
factor asks them to consider “the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”305 These are the

enforced, and molded entirely by courts. In this respect it is perhaps more common-law-like than
fair use, with courts often finding themselves completely free to adapt the doctrine to new contexts
and technological developments.” (footnotes omitted)).
300. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (stating that fair use cannot “be simplified with
bright-line rules, for the [copyright] statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case
analysis”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207, 209 (“[T]he fair-use criteria are so ambulatory that no one can give a general answer.”);
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Lecture, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1999) (“For all its
exposure, our understanding of fair use has not progressed much beyond Justice Story’s
observation [that the fair use doctrine] . . . was ‘one of those intricate and embarrassing
questions . . . in which it is not . . . easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down
any general principles applicable to all cases.’” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901))); Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (recognizing that not all works can be compared
in the same way); see also Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest
Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
669, 683 (2010) (“[T]he test for infringement of copyright is vague and determinations must be
made ‘ad hoc.’” (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960))).
301. See Balganesh, supra note 8, at 272 (“[T]he fair-use determination—at least as codified
today—makes use of factors and variables that are legitimately examined as part of the
substantial-similarity determination.”).
302. See Beebe, supra note 229, at 551 (“This affirmative defense represents the most
important—and amorphous—limitation on the otherwise extraordinarily broad rights granted to
copyright owners under section 106 of the Act.”); id. at 554 (“[M]uch of our conventional wisdom
about our fair use case law, deduced as it has been from the leading cases, is wrong.”); see also
Lippman, supra note 8, at 519 (“It[’s] unclear whether these opinions are representative of the
substantial similarity doctrine as it is practiced in courts today . . . .”).
303. For a discussion of the overlap, see Bracha & Golden, supra note 237, at 275–76. For a
discussion on utilitarianism in copyright law, see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights:
Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990). For a
discussion on how U.S. copyright law rejects “[p]ersonhood-based or analogous deontic
theories . . . as incapable of coexisting with the institution’s utilitarian focus,” see Balganesh,
supra note 8, at 21.
304. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
305. Id. § 107(3).
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same questions a court faces in a substantial similarity inquiry.306 Indeed,
for some, the extent of the overlap between substantial similarity and fair
use begs the question of whether one or the other is redundant. 307 In
focusing on the second and third factors, commentators miss the story
that the other two factors tell about substantial similarity.
The first fair use factor requires examination of “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”308 The fourth fair use factor
weighs “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”309 Collectively, these factors reference the economic
impact that the defendant’s work would likely have on the plaintiff, and
they are the most influential on courts.310 This should not be a part of the
substantial similarity test, but may have become part of it already. To the
extent that it has, it suggests that fair use is only the negative of substantial
similarity and thus noninfringing conduct.
Fair use regards kindly defendants who reuse the plaintiff’s work in a
transformative manner. One area is the categories of works courts have
tended to view as “fair,” such as parodies, other works that infuse the
original work with new meaning, and the use of the plaintiff’s work in
news reports, historical research, and comparative advertising.311 These
classes of works do not compete with copyrighted work but promote
culture and knowledge.312 Here, scholars can help courts and litigants
develop substantial similarity jurisprudence using fair use concepts.313
When rivals copy, they may infringe due to improper appropriation. In
contrast, nonrivals are more likely to fulfill the constitutional direction
and be proper.
Similarly, with regards to infringement, the Second Circuit, in
formulating the ordinary observer test, reasoned that since a plaintiff’s
306. Cohen, supra note 106, at 728 (“The degree of similarity between the two works was
also one of several factors considered in determining the broader equitable defense of fair use.
The fair use doctrine also considered the type of work involved and the way that the defendant
had used that work.”).
307. See id. at 745 (“A final problem with the traditional approach to copyright infringement
is the confusing overlap it creates with the fair use doctrine.”); Balganesh, supra note 8, at 272
(“[H]aving courts reconsider some of the same issues that they did under their preliminary
analysis of the entitlement seems highly redundant and palpably illogical.”).
308. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
309. Id. § 107(4).
310. Lydia Pallas Loren, Law, Visual Art, and Money, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1331,
1349 (2018) (“[T]hose two factors turn out to be the most important . . . .”).
311. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2544–46
(2009).
312. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1300–01 (2014).
313. See id. at 1301 (“Copyright’s hybrid audience, then, is intimately related not only to its
infringement analysis but also to the fair-use doctrine.”).
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legally protected interest lies in its potential financial returns from its
work, the work’s audience should make the substantial similarity
determination.314 The problem is that the modern courts rely too much on
market effects and too little on the visual or aural similarities between the
works at issue.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly315 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,316 the
Supreme Court set out when judges should accept, infer, or presume
causality.317 The touchstone is plausibility.318 Judges relying on
utilitarianism may lean on the lack of market effects to find against
plaintiffs rather than have to wrangle with complex tests the circuit courts
use to determine technical similarities. As discussed earlier, that skew
would be symptomatic of the difficulty of applying any of the substantial
similarity tests as they exist today. It would also evidence courts’
desperate latching onto market effects as a heuristic that both
conveniently comports with copyright’s utilitarian policy stance and is
simple enough to employ across diverse industries by judges
inexperienced in dealing with substantial similarity.
To some degree, every creator uses preexisting material that others
created. An emphasis on utilitarianism may lead courts to side with
plaintiffs only as far as it is necessary to advance knowledge and
learning.319 While plagiarists might be condemned on ethical grounds,
courts employing both fair use and substantial similarity have been much
more forgiving to nonrivals who use copyrighted work to produce their
work the same way.320 When rivals copy, they may infringe due to
improper appropriation. In contrast, nonrivals are more likely to fulfill
314. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other grounds
by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).
315. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
316. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
317. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
318. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”).
319. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 76
(2014) (“[E]xclusive rights in intellectual property can prevent competition in protected works,
thereby allowing the rightsholder to charge a premium for access and ultimately limiting these
valuable works’ diffusion to society at large. For another, given that knowledge is frequently
cumulative, society benefits when subsequent creators are not prevented from building on
previous artistic creations to generate new works.” (footnote omitted)); see also Loren, supra note
310, at 1352 (“[A]s a law that is designed to provide an incentive for artists to invest their time
and talent in the creation of new works, and as a law that exists in a capitalistic economy, a focus
in copyright on monetary effects of the use of another’s expression is understandable.”).
320. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992)
(discussing the importance of limits on the extent of protection “so as to avoid the effects of
monopolistic stagnation”); Loren, supra note 310, at 1348 (“The genesis of fair use is in the
recognition by courts of a need to allow for some copying of the expressive content of copyrighted
works, lest copyright lead to monopolistic stagnation in expression.”).
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the constitutional direction, and their use of the copyrighted work is
therefore more likely to be “proper.” Figure 8 (below) confirms this:
when the plaintiff and the defendant were nonrivals, defendants won on
the merits a stunning 42.9% of the time, compared to 16.7% of the time
when the parties were rivals.321
Figure 8: Relationship Between Outcomes and Whether Parties Were
Rivals

In sum, judges usurped plaintiffs’ access to juries and turned
substantial similarity from a standard by which to make holistic
comparisons of the works at issue into a convoluted rule. Further, courts
likely relied on economic substitution rather than technical substitution
as the yardstick for judging substantial similarity. These practices have
combined to erode plaintiffs’ ability to effectively control uses of their
works, with consequences for both copyright law and the civil justice
system generally.
Copyright law endows owners with the right to control the terms of
access through exclusive rights because they likely have the best
information about the value of their works; they are therefore entrusted
with the means to corral potential users to negotiate with authors and
obtain licenses or assignment of rights.322 In a healthy legal system, the

321. See Appendix, supra note 185.
322. See Nachbar, supra note 128, at 610 (“The best information about the value of a
particular work is more likely to be held by the work’s author . . . than anyone else . . . .”).
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specter of litigation is usually sufficient to protect those rights and deter
would-be infringers.323
The architecture of substantial similarity as conceived by today’s
courts, however, inherently favors defendants. Shielding defendants
could allow large defendants to prevent meaningful competition—as seen
with digital news publishing businesses—who are trying to ensure
compensation for the distribution of their content by outlets such as
Google.324 Or, a company might embrace a rival’s work, such as software
code, make minor tweaks, and make significant enough changes to render
the original code obsolete. Both harm competition and hurt incentives for
content producers. Copyright protection, even if narrow, limits this foul
play and provides incentives for original works of authorship to flourish.
III. THE ARCHITECTURE OF LIABILITY
The integrity of civil litigation depends on giving plaintiffs a
reasonable chance to succeed. To prove substantial similarity, plaintiffs
should only have to show that the works are holistically similar.
Defendants could then show they copied noncopyrightable rather than
copyrightable elements and should, therefore, be exonerated. Finally,
requiring plaintiffs to identify the expressive aspects of the works in their
copyright registrations will help clarify what they seek to protect and
provide notice to defendants. These key themes inform broader scholarly
debates on rules versus standards, doctrinal biases in civil litigation, and
the centrality of jury trials in the American justice system.
A. Rules and Standards
Arnstein formulated substantial similarity as a standard that courts
could more easily apply to the varied facts before them.325 Professor
Thomas Nachbar’s work reveals, however, that contrary to this,
substantial similarity today has ossified into a set of technocratic rules.326
Apart from their unwieldiness, outcomes under the extrinsic/intrinsic test
and other formal rules (like the more discerning ordinary observer test)
are inferior when they cause courts not to assign liability when the harm
from the defendants’ conduct exceeds its benefit in copying the plaintiffs’

323. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Empowering Individual Plaintiffs, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1320–21 (2017).
324. Sara Fischer & Margaret Harding McGill, The Future of Owning Content Online, AXIOS
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.axios.com/copyright-laws-digital-distributors-775bc197-79f5-4cb2
-bba0-5c36735b43bc.html [https://perma.cc/5CCE-PLMP].
325. See supra Section I.B.
326. See Nachbar, supra note 128, at 596 (“Other aspects of the copyright system look more
like standards, such as the ‘substantial similarity’ test for infringement (which has been clarified
to the point of near-rule-dom through decades of precedent) . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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work. These structured tests also require courts to compare thresholds of
copyrightability even though balancing would be easier.
To see why rules are an inferior means of determining substantial
similarity, consider how modern substantial similarity tests attempt to do
two difficult things. First, the tests must be able to metaphysically cleave
what is copyrightable in the plaintiff’s work from what is not. This
assumes courts have in their minds a threshold (C*) beyond which the
plaintiff’s work (C) becomes worthy of protection (i.e., C > C*).327
Second, courts attempt to compare what is copyrightable with the
defendant’s work and, in so doing, determine if the defendant’s work (H)
crosses some impermissible threshold (H*) that causes harm to the
plaintiff, making it worthy of disapproval (i.e., H > H*).
Finally, courts must still engage in some form of balancing. When one
consideration favors finding similarity (say appropriating copyrightable
content) and another opposes it (say because it involves an unprotectable
idea), the court must balance the competing forces while taking into
account the weight of the evidence and the importance of each factor,
finding for the plaintiff when C < H. Antitrust law’s rule of reason uses a
similar approach, as do Title VII and disparate impact determinations in
anti-discrimination law, strict scrutiny and proportionality analysis in
constitutional law,328 and personal jurisdiction analysis in civil
procedure.
Presented in a stylized fashion, substantial similarity occurs when
three conditions are satisfied: (1) C > C*; (2) H > H*; and (3) C < H. In
practice, structured rules are prone to generate capricious and wrong
results. These errors are possible even when courts are fully informed of
the facts required for balancing. Rules can trip courts up in two ways.329
First, they may require courts to dismiss the case even though C < H if H
< H*, regardless of the magnitude of C.330 The only way to eliminate this
possibility is to regard all harm as consequential, guaranteeing that H*
never matters.331 Second, structured decisions can result in infringement
even though C > H where C < C*.332 The solution is to set C* the same
as H by converting it into a balancing test; that is, in fact, what the
Arnstein court did.

327. This discussion draws on the framework developed in Professor Kaplow’s article. See
Louis Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures: Antitrust, Title VII Disparate
Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1381–84 (2019).
328. See id. at 1376, 1384.
329. See id. at 1382.
330. See id.
331. Id.
332. See id.
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Setting H* and C* modestly above zero helps filter out low-merit
cases and saves administrative costs.333 This means that courts can
consider if the party bringing the motion has stated a plausible claim at
the pretrial motion stage. Requiring plaintiffs to show a holistic similarity
between the works accomplishes that. The defendant’s rebuttal then helps
the court to fine-tune the values of C and H, while requiring plaintiffs to
provide claim-like details in their copyright registrations helps courts
define the values of H* and C*. Design law’s ordinary observer test also
contains all these elements.
Design patents protect an ornamental design for an article of
manufacture, and its infringement test parallels substantial similarity.334
Both tests ask if an adjudicator taking into account protectable elements
(and filtering out unprotectable elements) would find the works or
appearances at issue substantially alike.335 Both tests are also concerned
about the technical aspect: “[T]he appeal of the subject matter to the
audience’s aesthetic perception is what defines the nature of the subject
matter and, presumably, motivates its creation.”336 And, unlike in
trademark law, neither is concerned about the consumer’s understanding
as to the source of the goods.337
333. See Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured
Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992, 1044–46 (2019).
334. See Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 409, 409 (2012). Design patent looks at whether the designs are substantially the
same. See, e.g., id. at 410–12 (“The same problem comes up in copyright, where similarities in
unprotectable ideas or standard tropes should not suffice for liability, yet the gestalt substantial
similarity test risks holding defendants liable because of such commonalities.”); Sylvia Ngo, Note,
Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa: Patently Obvious? Reconciling the Ordinary Observer and Point of
Novelty Tests, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 110, 128 (2010) (“Courts may later want to restore
[ordinary observer] uniformity between designs and copyrights.”).
335. Compare Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (“We hold,
therefore, that if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually
gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is
infringed by the other.”), and Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc) (holding that the test for design patent infringement is whether the ordinary
observer would find the two designs to be substantially the same, in light of the prior art), with
Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We have explained
that two works are substantially similar [for purposes of a copyright infringement analysis] if [the]
‘ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them,
and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.’” (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988))).
336. Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights
Versus Selection of Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 248 (2013).
337. Id. at 247–48 (“That is, one commits copyright or design patent infringement simply by
copying the protected subject matter, regardless of whether that subject matter is recognizable to
consumers as the work of the rights holder or whether it is presented as the work of the copier.”).
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B. Three Lessons from Egyptian Goddess
To determine if accused designs are “substantially the same” to
patented designs, courts employ an “ordinary observer” standard.338 The
Supreme Court established this standard in Gorham Co. v. White.339
There, the Court held that if a person is deceived by one design into
thinking it is another after “giving such attention as a purchaser usually
gives,” the defendant infringes the patented design.340 In making that
determination, fact finders holistically compare the allegedly infringing
product along with the figures of the design patent before them.341
Over the years, courts, while paying lip service to Gorham, have
burdened plaintiffs with an additional “points of novelty” requirement.342
Courts examined the patented design’s innovative aspects individually,
and plaintiffs had to show their patented designs departed sufficiently
from the prior art.343 Much like modern substantial similarity tests, the
“point of novelty” requirement confined plaintiffs to only the dissected
elements that were new. Again, courts ostensibly did this to protect
defendants from infringement when the accused device did not contain
novel design features that justified awarding patentees their design
patents in the first place.344 Whatever the reason, the points of novelty
test, like substantial similarity, overemphasized subtle differences that
did not affect the protected overall design, allowing defendants to avoid
infringement by omitting one or more “points of novelty.”345

The holistic comparison is limited to the claimed design. See id. If the design patent claim is only
on the handle of the frying pan, the comparison is to the overall appearance of the handle of the
accused product, not the overall appearance of the entire accused product.
338. Gorham Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 528.
339. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871); see id. at 528 (describing how a patent is infringed “if,
in the eye of an ordinary observer . . . two designs are substantially the same,” which thereby
would “deceive such an observer,” and “induc[e] him to purchase one supposing it to be the
other”).
340. Id. (noting how an ordinary observer would be “giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives” to the overall visual impression of the design as a whole).
341. Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents, COLO.
LAW., July 2009, at 71, 71.
342. See, e.g., Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (describing how the plaintiff has not met the points of novelty test).
343. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113, 1118
(Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc).
344. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (inserting
a novelty requirement into previous infringement tests), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
345. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 3

644

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

To address this, the Federal Circuit issued a unanimous en banc
decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.346 The court reaffirmed
Gorham’s standard for infringement—the test was whether an ordinary
observer familiar with the prior art would think the accused infringing
design and the patented design were substantially similar when compared
holistically.347 In doing so, the court recognized that plaintiffs’ protection
under design law was whittled to a husk when defendants could copy the
overall appearance of an original work save for a few lines noticeable
only by experts.348 Moreover, the court did not want “the point of
novelty” to trip up fact finders, notably when the protected design
combined existing features.349
Novelty still mattered but was to be assessed separately.350 Placing
this burden on defendants made sense because they had the “motivation
to point out close prior art, and in particular to call to the court’s attention
the prior art that an ordinary observer [was] most likely to regard as
highlighting the differences between the claimed and accused design.”351
Scholars widely agree Egyptian Goddess revitalized the “ordinary
observer” test and significantly boosted plaintiff success rates because
patentees no longer had to prove that the allegedly infringing device
includes all of the points of novelty found in the patented design.352
346. 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); id. at 677 (holding that the “proper inquiry” is
“whether the accused design has appropriated the claimed design as a whole”); see also id. at 683
(“[A] purchaser familiar with the prior art would be deceived by the similarity between the
claimed and accused designs . . . .”).
347. See id.
348. See id. at 670, 677 (“[The] sameness of appearance, and mere difference of lines in the
drawing or sketch . . . or slight variances in configuration . . . will not destroy the substantial
identity.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 511, 526–27 (1871))).
349. See id. at 677; see also Sarah Burnick, Note, The Importance of the Design Patent to
Modern Day Technology: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Narrow the Damages Clause in
Samsung v. Apple, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 283, 297–98 (2017) (describing how the reformed
“ordinary observer” test under Egyptian Goddess makes it far easier to demonstrate infringement
in court because the jury is able to look at the whole picture of the design, allowing the design
patent to serve as a strong tool against infringement).
350. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678–79.
351. See id.
352. Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design
Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531, 532 (2009/10) (“Many commentators heralded this
decision as ushering in a new era for design protection in the United States. . . . [I]ts holding
should make it easier to enforce design patents . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see Perry J. Saidman,
Egyptian Goddess Exposed! But Not in the Buff(er)..., 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859,
884–85 (2008) (stating that eliminating the points of novelty test in Egyptian Goddess is a
“significant boost to design patentees”); LOIS F. HERZECA & HOWARD S. HOGAN, FASHION LAW
AND BUSINESS 180 (2013) (noting that designers have a “de facto increase in scope of protection”
(quoting Christopher V. Carani, Design Law & Footwear: Landmark Case Fundamentally Alters
Design Patent Enforcement, SHOE RETAILING TODAY, July–Aug. 2009, at 26)).
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Egyptian Goddess also increased the value of design patents.353 It is worth
underscoring the causal link between shifting the burden of production to
defendants and the increase in the value of the intellectual property
right,354 as well as the inquiry being a factual and not a legal one.355 In
these aspects, the success of Egyptian Goddess provides an essential
roadmap for reforming substantial similarity.
1. Compare the Works as Wholes
In design law, holistic comparisons maintain the “focus on those
aspects of a design which render the design different from prior art
designs,” while at the same time avoiding “the risk of assigning
exaggerated importance to small differences between the claimed and
accused designs relating to an insignificant feature simply because that
feature can be characterized as a point of novelty.”356 Like Egyptian
Goddess, Arnstein gave courts a tool that allowed them to simply look at
two works as a first step and determine if they were similar without
engaging in complicated mental dissections of copyrightable content.357
As Christopher Carani and Dunstan Barnes noted:
[E]xclusivity rights conferred by a design patent are for the
overall appearance of the design as set forth in the design
patent. For example, for a design patent directed to a hinge,
it does not protect how the hinge swivels. Rather, the design
patent only protects the appearance of the hinge. Faithful
353. Susan Scafidi, Towards A Jurisprudence of Fashion, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 429, 430 (2019) (“In Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa, the Federal Circuit’s abandonment
of a five-point novelty test for design patent infringement made design patents a far more
attractive means of protection for all sorts of fashion-related products, not just the nail buffers at
issue in that case.”); Kugler & Mueller, supra note 341, at 73; see also Susanna Monseau,
European Design Rights: A Model for the Protection of All Designers from Piracy, 48 AM. BUS.
L.J. 27, 43 (2011) (“[T]he simplified test might encourage more use of design patents by fashion
and other designers . . . .”).
354. See Kugler & Mueller, supra note 341, at 71 (describing “how the burden of proof has
shifted to now favor the patent holder”); id. at 73 (describing how the holding in Egyptian Goddess
“broadened the protection afforded by issued design patents and the potential protection afforded
by pending design patent applications”).
355. See David Leason, Design Patent Protection for Animated Computer-Generated Icons,
91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 580, 592 (2009) (“[T]here will be an increased chance of a
trier of fact finding infringement under the guidelines set forth by the Federal Circuit in Egyptian
Goddess.”).
356. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677 (quoting Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited,
Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
357. See Du Mont, supra note 352, at 532 (“[T]he Federal Circuit . . . advised district courts
[that] they need not provide detailed verbal descriptions for design patents during claim
construction.”); Ngo, supra note 334, at 130 (“There are fewer technical points for a fact-finder
to review . . . .”); see also id. at 131 (reporting “the view of many that this test is a lowered standard
of finding infringement”).
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adherence to the basic principle that design patents only
protect the appearance of a product, and not its underlying
function, should address most, if not all, concerns about
design patents being misused as backdoor utility patents.358
The problem is that modern copyright courts too quickly conclude that
accused works do not infringe copyrighted works because of their
similarity to what is in the public domain.359 An overemphasis on
different features that are uncopyrightable departs from how real-world
consumers perceive the work. This results in works being found
noninfringing due to differences that would have been irrelevant to a realworld observer.360 Professor Helfing observed:
As to similarity in total concept and feel, the courts initially
disfavored summary disposition because that quality is
measured by the subjective response of an ordinary person.
The Ninth Circuit has been mostly faithful to this judicial
restraint. The Second Circuit, however, has loosened the
reins and expressly authorized the summary resolution of
claims on the basis of a judge’s emotional response to works
of authorship.361
Copyright law itself supports the principle of judging works
holistically. While the Copyright Act gives little guidance on
infringement, it does guide the nature of a work. The definition of
“created” in the Copyright Act makes clear that works are unitary
wholes.362 With multiple versions, each is a separate work.363 The scope
of copyright and exclusive rights in turn map to these definitions.
Copyright subsists in complete works, and this holistic focus on the
“work” extends to infringement analysis. Seen in this light, the ordinary
observer should evaluate the works’ overall effect and compare them in
a single process without dissecting them into individual elements.
Furthermore, holistic comparisons go beyond exact reproduction to
encompass “various modes in which the matter of any work may be
358. Christopher V. Carani & Dunstan H. Barnes, United States, in DESIGN RIGHTS 9, 38
(Christopher V. Carani ed., 2017).
359. See Tushnet, supra note 334, at 420 (“‘They all look alike to me’ is a cliché for a
reason.”); see also Helfing, supra note 10, at 764 (“Courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits have
not hesitated to summarily reject infringement claims based upon a judicial determination that the
similarity between works fails to meet the ‘objective criteria’ of protection.”).
360. See supra Sections I.B, II.B.
361. Helfing, supra note 10, at 764 (footnotes omitted).
362. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (noting that works are created when fixed, and when works are
fixed in pieces over time, the then-existing fixation constitutes the work).
363. Id. “Joint work[s]” are created when the works of two or more authors are intertwined
into a single, inseparable whole. Id. “Copies” are the tangible mediums in which an (entire) work
is fixed. Id.
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adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable
alterations to disguise the piracy.”364 Every substantial similarity case
involves nonidentical work.365 A defendant’s copied work is like purple
paint—a mix of the plaintiff’s red paint and blue paint from the public
domain. Plaintiffs try to convince courts that the shade of red in the purple
paint matches the shade of red in the cans at their stores.366 If the accused
work, seen as a whole, gives rise to a similar reaction as the protected
work, and if, as a result, the fact finder cannot differentiate between the
two, then there is a colorable case of infringement. Of course, there is a
difference between holistic comparison of an ordinary observer and
holistic comparison in light of understanding what differentiates the
claimed design (or copyrighted expression) from the prior art (and other
unprotected elements, like ideas and scènes à faire). Conversely, if the
works are sufficiently distinct to the ordinary informed observer, the
plaintiff has not met its burden of proving substantial similarity between
the two works.367 This sets a presumptive scope of the copyrighted work,
which defendants can then rebut.368
Once the fact finder has determined both copying and facial similarity,
a presumption provides a useful means of adding clarity and
predictability to the analysis.369 The burden-shifting approach is well
established as a means of correcting the imbalance between plaintiffs and
defendants.370 For instance, the Federal Rules of Evidence shift the
burden of producing evidence contradicting the presumed fact of copying
to the defendant, while retaining the burden of persuasion with the
plaintiff.371 Similarly, trademark plaintiffs must show that defendants’
use of their trademarks leads consumers to think defendants’ goods
belong to plaintiffs, that plaintiffs endorse defendants’ goods, or that

364. See Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947).
365. See supra Part I.
366. See Helfing, supra note 10, at 743–44.
367. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“In
some instances, the claimed design and the accused design will be sufficiently distinct that it will
be clear without more that the patentee has not met its burden of proving the two designs would
appear ‘substantially the same’ to the ordinary observer, as required by Gorham.”).
368. See Sarah Burstein, Intelligent Design & Egyptian Goddess: A Response to Professors
Buccafusco, Lemley & Masur, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 94, 98 (2019) (describing presumptive scope
in the context of design patents).
369. See David S. Welkowitz, The Virtues and Vices of Clarity in Trademark Law, 81 TENN.
L. REV. 145, 167 (2013) (advocating for presumptions as a means of improving “predictability
and ease of determination”).
370. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 323, at 1357 (advocating for shifting the
burden of proof in all cases “involving hidden interest and fees, so that the bank will lose the case
when it fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the disputed charges are reasonable
and fair”).
371. FED. R. EVID. 301.
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plaintiffs and defendants are legally related entities.372 Once plaintiffs
establish a facial likelihood of confusion, the law usually presumes
harm.373 Likewise, antitrust law applies a quick look approach when even
an observer with a rudimentary understanding of economics would
conclude that the defendant’s arrangement would be anticompetitive.374
Notably, the fact that the Supreme Court did not confine the analysis to a
judge with a rudimentary understanding of economics but rather an
observer with a rudimentary understanding of the field is instructive.375
After defendants make their cases on uncopyrightability, fact finders can
determine if they have carried the burden of production.
2. Restore the Ordinary Observer
Egyptian Goddess was careful to point out that the differences
between the claimed design and prior art designs could be “an important
component” of the analysis, but it was satisfied with applying the
“ordinary observer test through the eyes of an observer familiar with the
prior art.”376 The ordinary observer knows the market for the claimed and
accused designs.377 Indeed, the ordinary observer may know what an
expert does in a sophisticated market if that is the typical consumer, but
the default viewpoint is never that of an “expert.”378 This allows a
meaningful comparison of the accused devices with the patented claim
that could be made while keeping the inquiry predictable.379
It is easy to make much ado about whether the ordinary observer is
really “ordinary,” especially if the consumer is capable of juxtaposing
prior art with both patentee’s and defendant’s designs.380 However, there
372. David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine Keywords: Much
Ado About Something?, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 481, 497–98 (2013).
373. Id. at 498.
374. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
375. Garry A. Gabison, Juries Can Quick Look Too, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 271, 298
(2014) (“[I]t would be improper to assume the Court intended to restrict quick look to judges or
the FTC because if the Court wanted such restriction, it could have simply written so.”).
376. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 677–78 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc);
see Daniel J. Sherwinter, Top Intellectual Property Cases of 2008—Part I, COLO. LAW., Mar.
2009, at 49, 55.
377. See Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., 942 F.3d
1119, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
378. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); see also Cardiac Pacemakers,
Inc. v. Coratomic, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting that knowledge of prior
art is elevated because pacemakers are expensive and the consumer is usually a specialized
physician), aff’d, 702 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
379. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 674, 677.
380. See Ngo, supra note 334, at 125 (“The issue now is whether EGI’s observer is, in fact,
ordinary.”); see also Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test for Design
Patent Infringement—On a Crash Course with the Supreme Court’s Precedent in Gorham v.
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is nothing novel about judging similarity through the lens of an informed
ordinary observer when appropriate. As early as 1933, design law
recognized that ordinary observers could be knowledgeable about the
field in question.381 At the same time, fact finders need not put their
everyday sensibilities and perceptions aside to judge if someone else
would find that the defendant had infringed the copyrighted work.
Arnstein, too, had faith that fact finders could visually or aurally
compare most, if not all, the diverse range of copyrighted works from
architecture to music.382 If case features like technology require expert
testimony to educate the jury, Arnstein allows it.383 Patent law relies on a
skilled person in the art, and trademark law relies on the perception of
consumers.384 Copyright law’s substantial similarity test uses a hybrid
standard, drawing both on expert and nonexpert observers; post-Arnstein,
however, the expert/judicial assessment has subsumed the lay
assessment, which is a question of fact.385
Jurors routinely get the task of filtering the copyrightable from the
uncopyrightable. In Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,386 the court ruled that
the jury should have been instructed to filter out any use of the command
interface necessary for compatibility, even if the interface was
copyrightable.387 When courts use experts, “the experts cannot tell a jury
whether two products are similar; however, the experts may educate a
jury on some subtests and the function of each element of the product.”388

White, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354, 357, 370 (2009) (warning that the observer in
Egyptian Goddess may be in conflict with the ordinary observer in Gorham Co. v. White).
381. See Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary observer is not any observer, but one who, with less than the trained
facilities of the expert, is ‘a purchaser of things of similar design,’ or ‘one interested in the
subject’ . . . one who, though not an expert, has reasonable familiarity with such objects . . . .”
(first omission in original) (quoting Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d
428, 430 (6th Cir. 1933))), abrogated by Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
382. See discussion supra Section I.B.
383. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (allowing expert testimony
under the substantial similarity test), abrogated on other grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus.
Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).
384. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 312, at 1273; see also id. at 1299 (“Unlike trademark and
patent law, copyright does assess infringement using a hybrid of technical similarity and market
substitution from the vantage point of both the consumer and the expert.”).
385. See id.
386. 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
387. Id. at 1547 (“It is an incorrect statement of the law that interface specifications are not
copyrightable as a matter of law. [Defendant] is correct, however, in arguing that the district court
erred in not instructing the jury on the legal consequences of copying dictated by compatibility
requirements.” (footnote omitted)).
388. Gabison, supra note 375, at 302.
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The fact finder then makes the final decision on the question of
infringement.389
Keeping the inquiry grounded in real-world perceptions of the
intended audience will make the infringement decisions more consistent
because the fact finders need not elevate the ordinary observer at a whim,
based on the consumer’s knowledge, while automatically tailoring the
ordinary observer to the specific work of authorship at issue. According
to Professor Helfing, judges pose a greater risk in reaching biased
outcomes compared to juries since “[a] judge is more likely to make the
decision based upon a comparison of an emotional response to relevant—
that is, protected—content; a jury, however, provides better
representation of that fictitious ordinary person whose emotions are
meant to be the measure of that response.”390
Reasonable minds may disagree on normative questions that concern
the permissibility of similar use. However, it is the public, as represented
by the jury, instead of the judge, for whom copyright and its fruits exist.
A heterogeneous jury offers a more diversified perspective that informs
the meaning and implications of judging similarity. It is time to return to
the original conception of substantial similarity as a fact-intensive inquiry
most appropriate for the jury.
3. Include a Claim-Like Requirement in Copyright Registrations
Copyright plaintiffs have exclusive rights in their works. Unlike other
types of intellectual property rights, however, those rights are only
defined at the point of infringement. Requiring copyright owners to
provide a simple description of what they claim to be copyrightable in the
work (and therefore protected by copyright law) will help stakeholders
have a better idea of its scope before infringement. During litigation, that
description will help focus the fact finder’s attention on the copyrightable
aspects of the plaintiff’s work in making the infringement determination.
While copyright ownership exists without registration, copyright law
requires plaintiffs to register their work as a precondition to a civil action
for copyright infringement.391 To register, the copyright owner delivers
389. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), abrogated on other
grounds by Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1975).
390. Helfing, supra note 10, at 765.
391. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)
(noting that infringement depends only on plaintiffs’ establishing ownership of a valid copyright
and on defendants’ copying original elements in those works); see also Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014) (“Although registration is ‘permissive,’ both the
certificate and the original work must be on file with the Copyright Office before a copyright
owner can sue for infringement.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 408)); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co.,
23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1994) (“While registration is required under section 411 of the
Copyright Act in order to bring a suit for infringement, infringement itself is not conditioned upon
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to the U.S. Copyright Office an application, a fee, and a deposit of one or
more copies of the work.392 Since the bar to copyrightability is extremely
low, this stage is largely pro forma.393 A registration specialist then
examines the materials to determine whether the work constitutes
copyrightable subject matter and if the applicant has met the other legal
and formal requirements.394 Prior to 2019, circuits disagreed over
whether copyright is registered when the U.S. Copyright Office receives
the copyright holder’s application or when the Office acts on the
application.395 In any case, neither plaintiffs nor defendants know the
scope of the copyright for the work before a court’s determination.
To patent and trademark scholars, that indeterminacy is astounding.
Patent and trademark registrations provide notice to third parties of both
the existing right and its potential scope.396 For example, patents
generally contain three parts: the specification, the drawings, and the
claims.397 The specification and the drawings provide a complete
description of the new invention, including how to make and use it.398 A
patent must also contain one or more claims that precisely define the
invention.399
Once the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues the patent, the
information contained in the patent gives the public notice of what
constitutes the “patented invention.”400 The patent claims define the legal
registration of the copyright. Thus, a copyright holder can register a copyright and file suit after
infringement occurs.” (citation omitted)).
392. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a); see also id. § 408(b) (listing what shall be included in the material
deposited for registration).
393. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as
they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.” (quoting
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 41, § 1.08[C][1])). Since most works are not registered unless or
until litigation, this leads to a lack of knowledge of what is out there. Cf. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 4, § 7.16[B][3] (stating that only sometimes do copyright owners register their works
long before infringement and discussing many cases in which copyright owners did not register
their works before wanting to sue).
394. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 602.4(B)
(3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2UA
-6J6E].
395. See Thomas M. Landrigan, Note, Application or Registration?: Confusion Regarding
the Copyright Act’s Prerequisite to Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 44 IND. L. REV. 581, 585
(2011). In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split. See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2019) (holding that registration occurs when
the Copyright Office acts on the application and officially registers the copyright).
396. In the case of trademarks, the notice provides a representation of the mark, as well as
the goods and services the mark covers. In the case of patents, the notice informs the claimed
scope of the invention.
397. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2).
398. Id. § 112(a).
399. Id. § 112(b).
400. Id. § 271(a).
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boundaries of the invention and the owner’s corresponding right to
exclude.401 Egyptian Goddess instructed that designs “‘typically are
claimed as shown in drawings,’ and that claim construction ‘is adapted
accordingly.’”402 While claim construction has its share of problems, it
helps resolve the structural uncertainties in copyright scope related to
substantial similarity.403
Judging substantial similarity can be daunting, precisely because the
fact finder must distinguish copyrightable expression from unprotected
factual description without the linguistic aids like those found in patent
claims.404 A brief description setting out the expressive elements in the
work would go a long way in helping to clarify the claimed copyright
scope of the work ahead of litigation. Requiring a claim-like requirement,
together with restoring the ordinary observer and comparing works
holistically, will help courts apply both technical and market-based
approaches to substantial similarity.
The obstacle to successful implementation may be one of costeffective design. The copyright system deals with a staggering number of
works—over 38 million in fiscal year 2018 alone.405 Each patent
application costs about $15,000–$20,000 to draft and prosecute.406
Further, unless the U.S. Copyright Office examines the claims’
substantive validity, including protectable elements, it is easy to dismiss
the claims as less valuable than those examined under the patent system.
However, these objections rest on two fundamental errors. First,
copyright claims need not be crafted by experts, particularly if substantial
similarity is ultimately a question for the ordinary observer and not the
person having ordinary skill in the art (as is the case in patent law).
Indeed, much ink has been spilled in this Article in arguing precisely that
the law has become too technocratic in its reliance on pretrial motions
and expert evidence. Jurors, looking through the lens of the ordinary
observer, seek to determine if the works are holistically similar and
401. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is a ‘bedrock
principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is
entitled the right to exclude.’” (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
402. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(quoting Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
403. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 42, at 2203 (advocating that nonpatent regimes
look into modified forms of Markman proceedings).
404. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
405. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 2018, at 6 (2018),
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2018/ar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MBF-8Z69].
406. Tysver Beck Evans, Patent Application Cost, BITLAW GUIDANCE,
https://www.bitlaw.com/guidance/patent/what-does-a-patent-application-cost.html
[https://perma.cc/GGL8-JF2G].
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account for whatever defendants claim to be unprotectable in their
analysis. Like the ordinary observer test itself, the copyright registration
provides a lay reference point, not an expert reference point as to what is
protectible. Second, the perfect is the enemy of the good. At the current
baseline, courts do not consider copyright registrations in assessing
substantial similarity. The goal is not the technical precision of patent
claims but simply requiring copyright registrants to state what it is they
think is copyrightable. Systemic costs and lawyering fees are obstacles if
one seeks to replicate the patent system, but that is not the goal here. Even
simple linguistic aids would be an improvement over the status quo.
Technology is making registration simpler for authors. Starting in
August 2020, “social media influencers and other authors of online
content can take advantage of a new group copyright registration option
for short online works such as blog entries, social media posts and web
articles.”407 “Authors could even register their own comments to a social
[media] post as separate copyrightable works in certain situations.”408
Developments like these are promising, and they illustrate why one
should never assume things cannot be done differently simply because
they have never been done before.
C. Broader Implications
Beyond copyright, insights on reforming substantial similarity
contribute directly to broader scholarly debates on rules versus standards,
doctrinal biases in civil litigation, and the centrality of jury trials in the
American justice system.
1. Rules and Standards
Scholars have long debated whether rules or standards best translate
policy into law.409 People frequently interact with some areas of the law,
such as healthcare, safety regulations, and the vesting of intellectual
property rights. For this reason, the requirement that original works be
fixed in a tangible medium of expression to enjoy protection is a rule.410
It determines whether copyright exists—a determination that occurs
407. Jason Mueller & Robert Hough II, United States: Easier Copyright Registration
Coming for Blogs and Social Media Posts, MONDAQ (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/copyright/975216/easier-copyright-registration-coming-for-blogs-and-social-mediaposts-?email_access=on [https://perma.cc/K8TC-LLLC].
408. Id.
409. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 65 (1983).
410. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
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much more frequently than whether a defendant has infringed on that
copyright. People interact less often with other laws, such as those
relating to negligence and substantial similarity. When they do, factual
permutations can materially differ, or they cannot foresee all potential
abuses of the law and how best to address them.411 Since designing a rule
for every contingency is counterproductive, the law prefers to use
standards to balance different factors because they are easier to craft and
tend to better track policy goals.412
To properly apply substantial similarity, one must identify the
threshold of substantiality and the kinds of copying public policy favors.
Substantial similarity jurisprudence currently does not have much
theoretical depth. Courts need to provide that content through better
theorized precedent. Standards, therefore, shift that cost ex post to
attorneys and courts who apply them on a case-by-case basis.413
Judges may have little incentive to spend the time and effort to master
the literature sufficiently to contribute to that depth, and the court’s
precedent may not be sufficiently similar to future fact patterns to predict
how the law would apply. This may also have something to do with the
fact that, as this Article shows, judges today approach substantial
similarity as a matter of first impression.414 Like muddy footprints,
substantial similarity shows the imprint of judges forced to apply
complex rules rather than the everyday wisdom of the ordinary
observer.415
As seen in Section III.B, infringement determinations are made after
the fact and only during litigation. Some parties may therefore not bother
to consult the law before acting. The ones who do must seek expert advice
in ordering their affairs since even judges and scholars cannot correctly
understand the standard’s technocratic contours. This feeds back into a
loop between the courts and those they serve—one that obfuscates the
law more and more over time.
Fact-specific standards can be disadvantageous, but they do fare better
than strict rules in changing circumstances.416 A decades-old standard can
be applied to conduct using present understandings. In contrast, rules
411. Legal scholar Roscoe Pound stated that “no two cases of negligence have been alike or
ever will be alike.” ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 142 (1922).
412. See Nachbar, supra note 128, at 599 (“Generally, reallocations involving consumptive
uses tend to look more like rules and those regarding productive uses tend to look more like
standards, which makes sense if the effect of productive uses on the underlying work is more
highly variable than the effect of consumptive uses.”).
413. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 563 (1992).
414. See supra Section II.B.2.
415. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 47–48 (1990).
416. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.3, at 556 (6th ed.
2003).
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must be tweaked continuously, which requires more effort. When laws
cover disparate works of authorship, most relevant scenarios are likely to
be more idiosyncratic. Section III.A makes a case for returning to
standards-based adjudication of substantial similarity, and Section III.B
sets out how to do so with reference to Egyptian Goddess. At the same
time, clarity depends on more than formal enactments, precedents, and
the results of past cases.
Perfect clarity would be unrealistic. Instead, courts should keep an eye
on the marginal cost and benefit of the level of clarity sufficient for their
precedential decisions to identify factors that influence the
determination.417 Compared to the overly technocratic rules-based
formulations of substantial similarity, parties who know peers would
judge their actions can more easily adjust their actions to societal norms
based on what they think a lay jury would find appropriate. Individuals’
common knowledge will allow confident prediction in some contexts,
even when precise official pronouncements are either not consulted or do
not exist.
2. Judges and Juries
The widespread practice of treating substantial similarity as a de facto
question of law for a judge to decide should be a matter of constitutional
concern.418 Substantial similarity remains an issue of fact, despite most
judges deeming it appropriate to decide on behalf of the jury when “no
reasonable jury” would disagree with them.419 When courts do not follow
the rules of summary judgment, such as when courts declare that no
issues exist for a jury to determine when such issues do exist, judges, in
fact, rob plaintiffs of the right to trial by jury.420
That right to a trial by jury stretches back to 1791, when the new
United States of America ratified the Bill of Rights, the first ten
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, confirming the fundamental rights
417. Kaplow, supra note 413, at 582 (“[T]he value of a more accurate ex post adjudication
lies in its ex ante effect on behavior.”).
418. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 135–36 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting)
(“‘[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.’ . . . A little water, trickling here and there
through a dam, is a small matter in itself; but it may be a sinister menace to the security of the
dam, which those living in the valley below will do well to heed.” (quoting Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886))).
419. See supra Section II.B.
420. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1075 (2003) (acknowledging constitutional problems in
summary judgment that arise in certain circumstances and declaring that “if no ‘genuine issue of
material fact’ exists and the movant is entitled to judgment ‘as a matter of law,’ pretrial disposition
does not raise questions of constitutional dimensions”).
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of its citizens.421 The Founders considered the guarantee of a jury trial
“essential in every free country,”422 reflecting the trust in citizens to
decide a matter requiring discretionary judgment more than a single
aristocratic judge.423 The rationale was that juries were the best available
means to “rein in corrupt or overactive judges.”424
The Supreme Court first introduced the reasonable observer standard
in Lynch v. Donnelly,425 and it “gradually became a part of the Court’s
Establishment Clause doctrine as a means for evaluating the
constitutionality of a government action’s effect.”426 In Salazar v.
Buono,427 the Court acknowledged that the reasonable observer standard
is a fact-sensitive inquiry.428 Professor Garry Gabison observed that “[i]t
seems almost natural that a jury of our peers would be more adept to
express this average opinion than a bench of well-educated judges.”429
He also noted that “the reasonable observer standard has evolved into a
mixed question of law and fact and with Salazar, seems to [be] moving
closer to a question of fact.”430 Whether judges’ experience or familiarity
with the doctrine provides them with an advantage in drawing the
inferences is open to question as a general matter.431 The data in Section
II.B show most judges encounter substantial similarity cases as a matter
of first impression, and they have failed to bring clarity to the doctrine
despite having decades to do so.
Some might argue that the pendulum has swung too far. Many jurors
lack higher educational backgrounds and, therefore, the legal
sophistication to draw and weigh inferences in complex or high-stakes
421. See Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 22 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); see also
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 212 (1999) (“By the time of Magna Carta the
inquest in civil cases was becoming fairly well established as the trial jury, although not in
criminal cases.”).
422. Federal Farmer IV: Oct. 12, 1787, INFOPLEASE (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.infoplease
.com/primary-sources/government/anti-federalist-papers/federal-farmer-iv [https://perma.cc/84
VG-YKRR].
423. See From Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux, 19 July 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0275 [https://perma.cc/T766-M62J]
(observing that the jury system “is the only way to ensure a long-continued and honest
administration of its powers”).
424. Landsman, supra note 421, at 38.
425. 465 U.S. 668 (1984); id. at 688, 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
426. Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s
Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 445 (2006).
427. 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
428. Id. at 721.
429. Gabison, supra note 375, at 300.
430. Id. (footnote omitted). The legal standard is so underspecified that it is easy for it to be
treated more like a question of law⎯and thus for the judge.
431. Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on
Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 517 (2010).
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copyright infringement cases.432 The dispute between Oracle and Google
contains both features.433 However, this overstates the factual issues
before jurors, which are usually straightforward judgments, and which
are made even simpler by this Article’s proposed reforms.434 In any case,
juries regularly consider complex factual issues. Antitrust cases require
juries to consider complex economic arguments, such as the impact of
anticompetitive activities on the competitive market.435 Products liability
cases require juries to weigh the safety benefits of an omitted design
feature against the costs of including it, accounting for any reduction in
the utility of the product.436
Those distrustful of juries’ ability to judge similarity can impose rules
to guide them.437 To develop meaningful guidance, jurors could be asked
to offer opinions or identify salient factors. Federal criminal sentencing
guidelines reflect such an approach.438 Government action outside the
formal lawmaking processes can also provide meaningful guidance for
future behavior through Copyright Office Manuals or guidelines as the
federal antitrust agencies issue to shape standards for compliance in
intellectual property licensing.439 These may have a substantial impact of
soft law, even if the results are not embodied in a regulation or formally
binding in a negligence suit or other legal proceeding.
Professors Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s seminal work for the
University of Chicago Jury Project showed juries were superior in
mediating disputes involving complex societal values.440 Several scholars

432. See David Nimmer, Juries and the Development of Fair Use Standards, 31 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 563, 587–89 (2018) (recognizing the belief that “laymen were not fit to
discharge the duties [of deciding the fair use issue] that were challenging even to specialists in the
field,” and arguing against that belief).
433. See Susan Decker, Google Could Owe Oracle $8.8 Billion in Android Fight,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2018, 2:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0327/oracle-wins-revival-of-billion-dollar-case-against-google [https://perma.cc/M5HQ-WQZ4].
434. See supra Section III.B.
435. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 497–98
(1988).
436. See, e.g., Casey v. Toyota Motor Eng’g Mfg. N. Am., Inc., 770 F.3d 322, 333–34 (5th
Cir. 2014).
437. Kaplow, supra note 333, at 1057 (“[W]hen decisionmakers are not entirely reliable,
rules that constrain balancing—and thereby sometimes result in decisions contrary to what a
properly performed balance would prescribe—can be desirable.”).
438. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
439. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 394 (providing guidance to agency
personnel, the courts, and the public on copyright law and registration); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. &
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download [https://perma.cc/GB4R-8NKF]
(publishing the government’s antitrust enforcement policy regarding intellectual property).
440. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1971).
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made a similar argument in the context of determining fair use of
copyrighted works.441 Notably, Professor Ned Snow argued:
The established practices and understandings of a
community define whether a use’s purpose is socially
beneficial, whether the content of the original work merits
strong protection, whether the defendant used a significant
quantity or a qualitatively substantial amount of the original
work, and whether the use could plausibly cause harm to a
potential market of the copyrighted work.442
Each case potentially deprives individual members of the public of
their property rights. Diversity brings a divergence of cultural
understandings, practices, and norms that may be central to deciding how
far those rights should reach.
3. Plaintiffs and Defendants
Rights and duties form the foundation of the American legal
system.443 These include freedom, bodily integrity, and property interests
and, concomitantly, obligations that third parties must adhere to.444
Rights, however, are not self-enforcing, and right holders must have a
credible legal means of vindicating them if they are to have any meaning.
Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein’s work shows that the
best way to realize the goals of compensation and deterrence is to enable
victims to pursue individual justice against those who wronged them.445
Class actions can deter wrongdoing but provide limited compensation for
the individual class members.446 Compensation funds also recompense
victims but do little to prevent future wrongs.447

441. See, e.g., Ned Snow, Who Decides Fair Use—Judge or Jury?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 275,
325 (2019) (“This characteristic of diversity is especially relevant in deciding whether a use is
fair, for an assessment of fairness demands an understanding of cultural norms and social
values.”); see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Commentary, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use
Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (1990) (“The reference to fairness in the doctrine of fair
use imparts to the copyright scheme a bounded normative element that . . . . gives effect to the
community’s established practices and understandings . . . .”).
442. Snow, supra note 441, at 325–26 (“The institution of a judge, by contrast, lacks such a
heterogeneous perspective.”).
443. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28 (1913).
444. Id. at 20–25, 28–32, 41 (distinguishing legal and nonlegal interests).
445. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 323, at 1325 (“Lawsuits by individual victims are
unique in that they constitute the only litigation form that simultaneously advances the twin goals
of deterring wrongdoers and compensating victims.”).
446. Id. at 1325, 1352 (“[C]lass actions systematically fail to compensate individual
plaintiffs for their losses.”).
447. Id. at 1325.
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Like copyright plaintiffs, plaintiffs elsewhere face systemic bias. In a
breach of contract suit, the plaintiff must cumulatively show a valid
contract that imposes a duty on the defendant to act or refrain from acting,
and that the defendant breached the duty in a way that harmed the
plaintiff.448 In contrast, the defendant can rebut each element in multiple
ways.449 The procedural asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants
translates into plaintiffs expending resources to establish each element of
their cause of action, while defendants focus on a single ground to defend.
It is essential that plaintiffs face rigorous scrutiny in their attempt to
vindicate their rights. Still, when the numbers show steep declines in their
win rates in areas such as substantial similarity not seen elsewhere, the
civil justice system must be alert in examining and addressing the causes.
CONCLUSION
In 2018, David Zindel lost in a California federal district court on
claims that Fox Searchlight’s Academy Award-winning film “The Shape
of Water” copied his father’s 1969 play.450 The court dismissed the case,
concluding that any extrinsic similarities between the works were “too
general to be protected,” and that, as a matter of law, the works were not
substantially similar.451 Before the Ninth Circuit, Zindel argued it was
wrong to dismiss copyright infringement suits on a pretrial motion,
calling it “not only unwise, but even a denial of due process.”452 The
Ninth Circuit agreed.453 Victories like these make the news, but they also
hide the worst decline in the viability of substantial similarity claims over
the past century—something this Article reveals.
Substantial similarity requires courts to determine if copyrightable
aspects of the original work are present in the accused work. If so, fact
finders must decide if the accused work has sufficiently misappropriated
the protected elements to find infringement. The means for judging
similarity must strike a balance between providing ardent protection for
copyrightable works while allowing those who create innovative new
designs to use them fairly.
448. E.g., Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1121 (Cal. 2011).
449. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS (8th ed. 2013) (explaining
elements and defenses of contract actions).
450. Blake Brittain, Ex-Judge Kozinski Wins IP Ruling After Scandal-Marred Retirement,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 23, 2020, 9:40 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/kozinski-getsshape-of-water-case-reinstated-by-ninth-circuit [https://perma.cc/7X7M-WRFX].
451. Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. CV18-1435, 2018 WL 3601842, at *7
(C.D. Cal. July 23, 2018), rev’d, 815 F. App’x 158, 159–60 (9th Cir. 2020).
452. Blake Brittain & Melissa Heelan Stanzione, Kozinski Argues Case at 9th Circuit After
Sex Misconduct Claims, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 9, 2019, 4:35 PM), https://news.bloomberg
law.com/us-law-week/kozinski-returns-to-9th-cir-to-argue-shape-of-water-case [https://perma.cc
/RB4S-BYQF].
453. Zindel v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 815 F. App’x 158, 159–60 (9th Cir. 2020).
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Reform should focus on three aspects. First, courts should judge
works holistically from the vantage of an informed ordinary observer.
Avoiding elemental dissections of the copyrighted work makes
substantial similarity easier for fact finders to administer, which makes
them less likely to penalize plaintiffs whose works invariably incorporate
some unprotectable elements. Second, instead of indulgently granting
pretrial motions to defendants, courts should restore to the jurors their
proper role. The determinations about what appears similar to the work’s
intended audience is one the jury is well-positioned to make (with expert
advice, when appropriate). Third, plaintiffs’ identifying expressive
elements in copyright registrations will help clarify what they seek to
protect and provide notice to defendants.
Plaintiffs are indispensable to our legal system. They play a pivotal
role in exposing misconduct, and they help the copyright system achieve
its policy goals. Like predators in any ecological system, plaintiffs are
easy to vilify because their success necessarily means the demise of their
prey; in the case of copyright, making defendants pay royalties or having
them enjoined from their intended use. Erase any meaningful chance of
success, however, and the engine for producing creative new works will
splutter and collapse. The most important and immediate benefit of
reforming substantial similarity would be plaintiffs’ restored ability to
prove improper, actionable infringement. Restoring a reasonable chance
of succeeding in litigation to plaintiffs helps preserve public trust in the
law, and it is the right thing to do.
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